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sophisticated and well equipped, others say that it has operated on a mission basis without any concrete organizational or physical structure and with minimal or no command in some cases405, 406. Over the years, dissidents have reported receiving notifications from Facebook, that their content violated the platform’s policy. Many of them suspect that these notifications are the result of coordinated reporting by state-sponsored cyber groups. An example in 2023 is the case of Van Hai Nguyen, a journalist and blogger, who translated repor ts about a theft and money laundering scandal involving a state-owned bank. When he shared the translation on Facebook, his posts were flagged for platform violations, and he was unable to access his account for three days. This was not the first time the journalist reportedly experienced such a situation407. He said that previous posts that were critical of the government were also often flagged and taken down from the platform408. 405 406 407 408 409 410 Also in 2023, the Vietnam Reform Revolutionary Party or Viet Tan, an organization that aims to restore democracy and reform Vietnam, published a report detailing that their Facebook page was flagged 10 times for posts considered to violate Facebook’s Community Standards409. The report said that, after an appeal, Facebook reversed the take down for eight of the 10 posts, which are all about the political situation in Vietnam. Viet Tan noted the incredulity of some of the decisions, as one was flagged for violating the policy on suicide and self-injury, when the post was a criticism of the practice of attributing deaths under police detention to be caused by suicide. Because their page is frequently flagged, the page’s engagement and reach also reportedly plummeted410. 4. Threats Against Critics and Political Opposition In Vietnam, individuals are harassed and imprisoned on a regular basis for criticizing the communist government on social media. Those arrested are usually sentenced under Article 117 and 331 of the Criminal Code. Among the examples is the case of Bui Tuan Pearson, James. “Insight: How Vietnam’s ‘Influencer’ Army Wages Information Warfare on Facebook.” Reuters, 9 July 2021, www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-vietnams-influencer-army-wagesinformation-warfare-facebook-2021-07-09. Luong, Dien Nguyen An. “2021/22 ‘How the Vietnamese State Uses Cyber Troops to Shape Online Discourse’.” ISEAS, 2021, www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-22-how-the-vietnamesestate-uses-cyber-troops-to-shape-online-discourse-by-dien-nguyen-an-luong. Keeton-Olsen, Danielle. “The Vietnamese Military Has a Troll Army and Facebook Is Its Weapon.” Rest of World, 8 May 2023, restofworld.org/2023/force-47-vietnam-military-group-facebook. Ibid. “Censorship by Other Means: Case Study of Facebook’s Community Standards in Vietnam.” Viet Tan, 18 Dec. 2023, viettan.org/en/censorship-by-other-means. Ibid. 106

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Annual Report: Digital Rights in Southeast Asia 2023-2024

Report

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Language

English

Topic

Digital Rights
Digital Surveillance
Information Operation
Internet Connectivity / Accessibility
Internet Restrictions

Author(s)

DigitalReach

Date Published: Aug 6, 2024

Abstract: It is undeniable that information technology has significantly impacted human rights and democracy these days. Different governments around Southeast Asia continually attempt to control digital space through, for example, using repressive laws and regulations, forcing social media platforms to follow their orders, and using spyware and similar technology to surveil critics. In Southeast Asia, democracy and human rights have deteriorated because of these attempts, especially for countries under authoritarian regimes.

In order to better understand the situation, DigitalReach publishes annual reports to present and analyze the events and trends around the region. The 2023 annual report analyzes the digital rights situation in eight countries across Southeast Asia—namely Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam–from January 2023 to December 2023, with glimpses of key updates into 2024, given the timing of its release.

The report format has been changed completely from the previous years. In order to more systematically present the developments observed, the report is organized into three key areas: (1) Legal and Policy Developments, (2) Information Control and Manipulation, and (3) Threats Against Critics and Political Opposition.

From a regional perspective, legal and policy developments in countries that are known to restrict human rights are still mainly about using or coming up with new policies to further suppress human rights in the digital sphere. Countries considered to be more democratic also attempt to change or repeal their laws, but still without a clear sign of improvement toward digital rights.

In terms of information control and manipulation, social media platforms continue to be deployed for political ends, with different platforms serving a specific purpose for each country. The shift toward short video format, TikTok in particular, continued from 2022 to contribute toward information disorder, especially during election periods. The use of video shorts is important when targeting young voters, who played an important role in determining election results in Thailand and Indonesia this year like they did in the Philippines and Malaysia in 2022. State-sponsored cyber armies were also documented, while some governments preferred to assert more effective control of social media platforms. Other important methods related to the flow of information include suppression of media freedom and internet disruptions, which are particularly severe in Myanmar following the 2021 coup.

Judicial harassment is a key form of threat used against critics and political opposition in 2023. It is still common for people in Southeast Asia to be thrown in jail for what they say or do online. Others who do not subscribe to the government’s ideology face online harassment from state-sponsored cyber armies or government supporters. In terms of surveillance, 5 out of 8 countries included in this report have been found to have or are likely to have spyware technology.

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Primary Documents

2023-Annual-Report-FINAL-1.pdf
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Myanmar Internet Project

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Annual Report: Digital Rights in Southeast Asia 2023-2024

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