Vietnam reportedly found that TikTok has stored information that is considered to violate the law on its domestic servers, including fake information, distortion, and incitement of violence395. As of 2023, TikTok is the only platform that has an office in Vietnam, which is the reason why the company could be probed by authorities. Having a local office in a country that imposes digital repression can be a potential risk to a company, as the government can impose sanctions to make t he company comply with government orders. As the platform has around 50 million users in Vietnam, ranking among the highest in the world, many have been concerned about what would be the company’s next steps to protect its user base396. In addition, the Vietnamese government strategy to control content also includes the deployment of “opinion-shapers” to police content on social media platforms and shape 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 public opinion. Known to the public is Force 47, an army unit tasked to “fight proactively against the wrong views”397, 398. There are also “public opinion shapers” who are reportedly civilians who share the same ideology with the CPV and do the work as volunteers399,400. A report described them as recruited from young CPV members and the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union401. In the past, a now defunct Facebook group called “E47”, a name that is a clear reference to Force 47, also worked in coordination with the latter to target specific Facebook accounts considered as opposing the CPV402. Reuters reported that Force 47 was created in 2016, which then set up hundreds of Facebook groups and pages to publish thousands of pro-government articles and posts 403. When the cyber army became publicly known in 2017, the group reportedly had around around 10,000 personnel 404. While some reports describe the unit as Ibid. Kemp, Simon. “Digital 2023: Vietnam.” DataReportal, 13 Feb. 2023, datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-vietnam. Biddle, Sam. “Facebook Lets Vietnam’s Cyberarmy Target Dissidents, Rejecting a Celebrity’s Plea.” The Intercept, 21 Dec. 2020, theintercept.com/2020/12/21/facebook-vietnam-censorship. Luong, Dien Nguyen An. “2021/22 ‘How the Vietnamese State Uses Cyber Troops to Shape Online Discourse’.” ISEAS, 2021, www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-22-how-the-vietnamesestate-uses-cyber-troops-to-shape-online-discourse-by-dien-nguyen-an-luong. Ibid. Biddle, Sam. “Facebook Lets Vietnam’s Cyberarmy Target Dissidents, Rejecting a Celebrity’s Plea.” The Intercept, 21 Dec. 2020, theintercept.com/2020/12/21/facebook-vietnam-censorship. Ibid. Ibid. Pearson, James. “Insight: How Vietnam’s ‘Influencer’ Army Wages Information Warfare on Facebook.” Reuters, 9 July 2021, www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-vietnams-influencer-army-wages-informationwarfare-facebook-2021-07-09. “Vietnam Unveils 10,000-strong Cyber Unit to Combat ‘Wrong Views.’” Reuters, 26 Dec. 2017, www.reuters. com/article/idUSKBN1EK0XB. 105

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