retrieve them as the junta will then know who I am. It happened to a friend of mine after his
account was closed, he called them so then they had his phone number, found his address
and came to arrest him.” Users also reported the deactivation of their SIM cards. Then they
received a message saying that if they wanted it back in functioning mode, they had to provide
their GPS location, current addresses and names.
On January 3rd, the Nikkei Asian Review revealed that Telenor has also agreed to sell its 51%
stake in mobile payment service Wave Money to its main partner, a consortium led by
Singapore-listed Yoma Strategic Holdings. The company is owned by Myanmar tycoon Serge
Pun, who is also the CEO of New Yangon Development Company.
The military council has not yet completely shut down the Internet. It seems that the decision
may be part of damage control, but the SAC also benefits significantly from online activity. SAC
has already resorted to the most effective and easy to implement measures, such as cutting off
grids and networks, stalking social media accounts and monitoring smartphones. Netizens fear
that the military’s surveillance apparatus could become even more inescapable.
Journalist in exile Mratt Kyaw Thu compiled a list of national companies that provide technical
assistance to the military council, such as FISCA Security & Electrical Engineering Co., Ltd,
Yatanarpon Pan Myanmar, Royal Pan Myanmar or Myanmar Best Security Services. Soe Myint,
editor-in-chief of Mizzima, an independent media founded in exile in India back in 1998,
confirms: “They have been trained to crackdown on technologies and they know exactly where
the protestors are. They monitor social media very closely and confuse people.”
The advocacy group JFM unveiled Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Transport and
Communications budgets which contain purchases of technologies by the Myanmar police
force, the domestic intelligence agency and the military. These technologies were used to
collect digital data, hack passwords, clone phones, track signals, gather social media
intelligence, analyze photos and process and recover large amounts of data. They mostly come
from companies based in the West, and particularly the United States, and were purchased
before the coup by the military and civilian-controlled branches of government. “These
technologies are now all under military control and will likely be used to suppress dissent.”
warns the International Crisis Group (ICG) in its report “Myanmar’s Virtual Battlefield.” For
months, activists and researchers have been lobbying foreign governments to introduce or
broaden arms embargoes to cover ‘dual-use’ equipment, software and technologies that could
be employed to suppress political opposition. It is also vital that the activities of middlemen in
the private sector, who are the main facilitators of those secretive deals, are effectively
monitored and submitted to a harmonised legal framework.
For Sutawan ‘Ploy’ Chanprasert, it is urgent to act before the SAC can implement its next plans.
“As many credible news sources stated that the junta is aiming to build a gateway similar to the
Great Firewall of China, threats on digital rights can get more sophisticated if it is implemented.
This means that the junta’s efforts on censorship and surveillance can be much more effective
and coordinated as it will control the whole network traffic.”
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