24 EMBOLDENED OFFENDERS, ENDANGERED COMMUNITIES VII. Recommendations for stakeholders No single stakeholder can end internet shutdowns alone. Across all contexts, including during conflict, protests, elections, and exam periods, we urge states, private sector actors, donors, international organizations, and civil society to work together to #KeepItOn. 1. Parties to conflict, thirdparty actors, oversight bodies, and all other stakeholders must ensure by all means necessary that civilians in conflictaffected areas, as well as those fleeing, refugees, and the displaced, maintain reliable access to ICT infrastructure and essential communications platforms. • For the second consecutive year, conflict was the single largest trigger for internet shutdowns around the world. The staggering number of cases and increasingly complex network of perpetrators in 2024 show yet again that internet shutdowns are spreading in scope and scale, and the impacts are more dreadful for people and communities at risk. The targeting and wanton destruction of civilian connectivity and communication systems is increasingly happening in plain sight, and under the watch of the same states espousing the importance of connectivity and access to information in processes such as the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), Internet Governance Forum (IGF), Global Digital Compact (GDC), World Economic Forum (WEF), and beyond.99 All conflict parties must: » Reaffirm their commitment to respect human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) both online and offline, including the limits posed by IHL on activities that disable civilian objects, damage or disrupt civilian data, and interfere with medical as well as humanitarian work;100 » Immediately cease the indiscriminate destruction of civilian objects, including medical, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure101 and reaffirm the respect of agreed deconfliction mechanisms; and » Ensure that the civilian population has access to reliable, open, and secure telecommunications infrastructure, enabling them to receive early warnings, communicate with humanitarian services and their loved ones, and otherwise exercise their fundamental human rights. • Governments and the international community must hold perpetrators of gross human rights abuses and crimes against humanity under the cover of internet shutdowns, as well as their enablers, to account through any and all available avenues of justice. • All stakeholders must also recognize the plethora of digital harms on affected communities by reaffirming that protections under international legal frameworks fully extend to the digital domain and to civilian telecommunication objects, and embracing and applying the concept of a digital ceasefire.102 99 See, e.g., CEPA (2024), UN Avoids Surrendering the Internet to Russia and China — For Now, https://cepa.org/article/un-avoidssurrendering-the-internet-to-russia-and-china-for-now, but see also 7amleh (2024),Gaza Telecommunications Infrastructure, https://7amleh.org/ storage/Advocacy%20Reports/Telecommunications%20Report.pdf 100 ICRC (2024). Protecting civilians and other protected persons and objects against the potential human cost of ICT activities during armed conflict. https://rcrcconference.org/app/uploads/2024/10/34IC_R2-ICT-EN.pdf 101 ICRC (2024). ICRC president: "We are witnessing a global and collective failure to protect civilians in armed conflicts.” https://www.icrc.org/ en/document/global-and-collective-failure-to-protect-civilians-in-armed-conflict 102 Access Now (2024). Toward a digital ceasefire. https://www.accessnow.org/toward-a-digital-ceasefire/