Case Studies The following case studies provide snapshots of the contexts in which the weaponization of social media occurs and the specific tactics used. They are not intended to express opinions about who is “good” or “bad” in a specific context, but rather outline how social media has been weaponized and the impact of those activities on peace and stability. The concepts of misinformation and disinformation appear through each case study, forming the foundation of how social media is often weaponized, and are defined as follows:   Misinformation: incorrect information spread by people without the intent to deceive6 Disinformation: incorrect information spread to intentionally deceive or manipulate others7, including deliberately false news stories, manufactured protests, doctored content (such as photos or videos), and tampering with private communications before release. Warrap, Sudan | Miguel Samper for Mercy Corps See Appendix for in-depth case study examinations and findings. Case Study 1: Information operations — Russia’s targeting of the White Helmets in Syria In the digital era, coordinated disinformation operations have re-emerged as a central component of Russia’s information warfare strategy in places like Syria, a country of significant geostrategic importance for Russia that has been plagued by one of the worst refugee crises in modern history. Specifically, the Russian government has made systematic use of information operations to amplify manufactured claims and false accusations against the Syrian Civil Defense, also known as the White Helmets, a Nobel-prize nominated humanitarian organization made up of more than 3,000 volunteers who are credited with saving thousands of lives in Syria.8 In the context of armed conflict in Syria, Russia’s government has labeled the White Helmets a terrorist organization with links to al-Qaeda and ISIS. Weaponization via information operations Information operations — defined as “the integrated employment … of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries” — is a central component of Russia’s Information Warfare strategy.9 In such situations, conflict is not declared overtly, and most activities are carried out below the threshold of conventional means. 6 Bertolin, Giorgio. “Digital Hydra: Security Implications of False Information Online,” (NATO StratCom COE: May 2016). https://www.stratcomcoe.org/digital-hydra-security-implications-false-information-online. 7 Misinformation can have a powerful effect on divisiveness and chaos in a target society, as the truth becomes hard to discern. (CRS, 5) Civilians may knowingly or unknowingly be functioning as proxies on behalf of an adversary (CRS, 1). See also Bertolin, 5. 8 Di Giovanni, Janine. 16 October 2018. “Why Assad and Russia Target the White Helmets.” The New York Review of Books. https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/10/16/why-assad-and-russia-target-the-white-helmets/ 9 CRS, Information Warfare, 3 quoting Joint Chiefs of Staff: 3-13, “Information Operations” (November 27, 2012). MERCY CORPS The Weaponization of Social Media: How social media can spark violence and what can be done about it 8