4/29/24, 2:31 PM China Forces Myanmar Scam Syndicates to Move to Thai Border | United States Institute of Peace outside influence on the perpetrators is much more diffused. Most importantly, the Karen BGF has been highly adaptive following the collapse of the Kokang BGF, and Chinese law enforcement seems less inclined to tackle the scamming operations on borders other than its own, perhaps because access would require the cooperation of other governments. 2. The vast majority of the scam syndicates in Karen State are operating in zones controlled by Saw Chit Thu’s BGF, now rebranded as the KNA. He and his cohorts care little about the cause of Karen autonomy and democracy pursued by the KNU/KNLA but focus instead on maximizing profits from criminal activity. With a powerful and well-financed fighting force of more than 8,000 troops, neither the military nor the BGF/KNA wish to engage in direct conflict. They are said to enrich the Myanmar army with some 50 percent of the $192 million earned by the BGF/KNA annually from the Shwekokko Project. 3. Addressing issues related to human trafficking and repatriation is becoming more complex as the number of actors expands, and it is time for the U.S. and regional governments, especially Thailand, to exert leadership in supporting a strong and timely response to the situation in Karen state and its connection to the regional Chinese criminal network as a whole. The Shape of an International Response An effective response to the criminal scamming in Myanmar will require a multinational effort to tackle not only the Karen State sanctuary, but also its ties to scam networks operating across the region, which facilitate flexible transfer of criminal operations within Southeast Asia and beyond. The tasks of a multi-country effort would include: 1. Cutting cross-border services to the enclaves in Karen State and mounting an international law enforcement task force to bring key operators to justice and facilitate rapid repatriation of the enslaved labor force from the scam centers. 2. Disrupting connectivity between the criminal networks operating in Myanmar and their partners in other countries and territories, especially Cambodia, China, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/04/china-forces-myanmar-scam-syndicates-move-thai-border 7/11