5/22/22, 12:03 AM Myanmar: Freedom on the Net 2021 Country Report | Freedom House Of those surveyed, 15 percent said they had content removed. Since the coup, several news outlets have reported receiving Facebook warnings after they posted photos of murdered protesters. 136 In addition to Facebook, video platforms such as YouTube and TikTok have increased their content removals since the coup (see B5). 137 YouTube has removed at least five military-controlled channels, including the state-owned MRTV and the military-owned Myawaddy Media, MWD Variety, and MWD Myanmar. 138 Following international media attention, 139 TikTok slowly took action to remove some of the extremely violent videos posted by soldiers on the platform, many of which threatened peaceful protesters with various weapons and methods of murder. 140 In one video, viewed 180,000 times, a soldier says, “Don’t touch [the coup leader]. It will cost you your life. Hear? You will die.” 141 TikTok has been criticized by civil society for not learning the lessons from Facebook’s moderation failures in previous years. 142 While TikTok deleted many of the worst videos, technical glitches have left traces in place, and TikTok has not banned the military more broadly. 143 B4 0-4 pts Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 1/4 Since the coup, self-censorship online has grown significantly. Although many social media users have bravely condemned the coup and continue to do so, some have apparently taken self-censorship steps to hide their identity, such as changing their account names or removing photos. 144 The practice of using acronyms or nicknames for sensitive terms is now widespread across messaging tools. 145 The use of pseudonyms, which was common during earlier periods of military rule and enables people to speak out with less fear of detention and criminal prosecution, has grown despite a ban on the practice by Facebook and other social media platforms. 146 Many users have also stopped using normal phone lines and switched to encrypted smartphone apps, such as Signal and Telegram. 147 Hundreds of journalists are in hiding, and many have been detained for their journalism, particularly when reporting on the anticoup protests. 148 Self-censorship was common prior to the coup, including among journalists. 149 Journalists, online personalities, and ordinary users faced a range of pressures to agree with government narratives on matters related to the military, major business groups, armed conflict, the Rohingya, religion, and other important topics. 150 For example, some journalists and media outlets opted to use terms such as “Muslims” when referring to Rohingya to avoid potential ultranationalist backlash online; the term “Bengalis” is also sometimes used in a discriminatory attempt to link the Rohingya to Bangladesh and deny their basic rights in Myanmar. 151 Pro-Rohingya activists largely relied on social media and the international news media to share information about violence and discrimination in Rakhine State, partly because few domestic media outlets were willing to risk the security threats or boycotts that can result from reporting on the topic. 152 Since the coup, more Myanmar users have actively spoken out about the Rohingya, in some cases apologizing for not believing past atrocity allegations in the light of the military’s recent violence against civilians protesting its seizure of power. 153 TOP Self-censorship on gender issues is also widespread online among journalists and human rights defenders. 154 Women who discuss sex and women’s bodies online are often abused and harassed. 155 For example, while the global #MeToo campaign against sexual assault and harassment gained initial https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2021 12/28