Model Training Materials: Hate Speech, Defamation and National Security truth of value-judgments is not susceptible of proof”.72 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has similarly noted that “an opinion cannot be subjected to sanctions”.73 Even if a statement is false, the author should not be strictly liable, at least where the statement is part of a debate about a matter of public interest. Strict liability does not provide sufficient protection for honest mistakes. Even a diligent journalist, for example, will occasionally make inaccurate statements, particularly when reporting on sensitive matters where it is hard to identify trustworthy sources. A defence of “reasonable publication” should therefore be available, which applies when it was reasonable under the circumstances to make such a statement.74 Alternatively, similar defences can provide similar protection, such as that the speaker acted in good faith. For journalists, reasonableness can be established by reference to standards of journalistic ethics. An example of how the European Court of Human Rights has approached this issue is provided below. European Court of Human Rights, Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway A Norwegian newspaper and its editor were convicted of defamation for an article about seal hunting which included allegations of cruel and illegal hunting methods. The article was partly based on a controversial report by an inspector which subsequent investigations indicated was partly unsubstantiated. In assessing whether the defamation convictions violated the right to freedom of expression, the European Court’s Grand Chamber noted that it must apply a “most careful scrutiny” to sanctions which may discourage the press from participating in discussions of matters of legitimate public concern.75 On the other hand, the press also has special duties and responsibilities, including respecting the reputations of others. Ordinarily, this means that the press should verify factual allegations that are defamatory. But the Court then considered whether there were “special grounds” to dispense with this obligation.76 One factor in assessing whether such special grounds exist is whether the newspaper could reasonably rely on the inspector’s report as reliable. The Court held that the newspaper’s reliance on the report was reasonable and that there was “no reason to doubt that the newspaper acted in good faith in this respect”.77 Ultimately, the reputational interests at Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, Application No. 9815/82, para. 46, https://bit.ly/3TbPGnf (cited to in subsequent cases such as Dichand and Ors v. Austria, 26 February 2002, Application No. 29271/95, para. 42; and Dalban v. Romania, 28 September 1999, Application No. 28114/95, para. 49) 73 Kimel v. Argentina, note 56, para. 93;. See also Usón-Ramírez v. Venezuela, note 64, para. 86. 74 See, for example, 2021 Joint Declaration on Politicians and Public Officials and Freedom of Expression, note 35; 2000 Joint Declaration, note 63; and Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa, note 16, Principle 21(1)(a). 75 Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway, 20 May 1999, Application No. 21980/93, para. 64, https://bit.ly/3U9T3fR. 76 Ibid., paras. 65-66. 77 Ibid., para. 72. 72 The Centre for Law and Democracy is a non-profit human rights organisation working internationally to provide legal expertise on foundational rights for democracy. 18