We have to expect questions not only from military [checkpoints], but also from the local community. Journalists #1, #2, #3, #4, and #6 all highlight the potential security risks posed by “local communities” and “neighbours” and emphasise the need to avoid appearing “suspicious.” Some, like #4, #5, and #6, conceal their journalist status even from their families to mitigate risk. Journalist #4 had to relocate from a pro-military neighbourhood, while Journalist #1 consistently prepared a cover story for reporting trips, such as visiting her grandmother. Decades of military governance fostered a nearly omnipresent network of pro-military informers (dalan), which has permeated every corner of Myanmar even during times of quasi-civilian rule. This pervasive surveillance network has been described by Selth (2021) as a form of “state enduring intelligence.” Furthermore, the emergence of hardline Buddhist-nationalist groups has exacerbated the risks of crowdsourced surveillance, something clearly exemplified in the arrest of Sai Zaw Thaike. The military’s advocacy for a unified Burmese identity, which is also supported by Buddhist nationalists, has been characterised as a symbiotic relationship between monks and the military. Limited support from media houses Besides external threats, journalists face risks from their media employers, attributed to the organisations’ inadequate risk management strategies. This worrying sign, identified through interviews and corroborated in FGDs involving journalists and digital security experts, reveals the dwindling focus of media houses in supporting journalists in their digital security practices. 28