Crowdsourced surveillance As such, rather than deploying sophisticated social media monitoring tools, our informants believed that the military tends to flag individuals when their accounts gain prominence (“becomes popular”) through political commentary on platforms like Facebook. Journalist #6 cites the case of photojournalist Sai Zaw Thaike, who was sentenced to 20 years, as an example of someone targeted for being “distinct.” The data we gathered indicate that Sai Zaw Thaike’s apprehension resulted from a combination of crowdsourced surveillance and SAC’s manual inspection. His arrest was preceded by his critical coverage of hardline Buddhist-nationalist rallies that incited the anger of those groups. His Facebook profile consequently was monitored and amplified by hardline communities and his journalistic activities were exposed, leading to his reporting and subsequent targeting by SAC security officers. This low-tech surveillance seems to be further evidenced by reports of the laborious attempts of manual astroturfing by SAC security forces on social media, reliance on citizen reporting through Telegram channels to pinpoint dissidents, and the publication of a lengthy list of Facebook profiles in a state newspaper, presented merely as tables—suggesting a basic familiarity with digital publications and mass surveillance technology. Moreover, the military does not seem to have the infrastructure to maintain electronic records of national IDs—or, at least, is still in the process of developing one. As will be discussed in the section "Commonly Shared Digital Security Practices," journalists (#1, #2, and #6) have addressed the risk to their identity by obtaining alternative IDs, thereby navigating around the rudimentary security checks. Crucial to this low-tech inspection is the human infrastructure of surveillance. The role of pro-military citizen reporting in bolstering the junta’s inspection capabilities is a constantly recurring theme among the journalists we interviewed. As Journalist #1 explains, 27