6 | ELECTION PHASES WILL FURTHER RAMP UP CONFLICT On 14 September, the UEC announced that elections would not be held in 121 constituencies, including 56 for Pyithu Hluttaw, nine for Amyotha Hluttaw (first-past-the-post), and 56 for state and region hluttaws (firstpast-the-post). However, ten of the 56 townships affected by election cancelations are not under martial law, while the junta is still planning to hold elections in 17 townships under martial law. While these discrepancies were not explained by the UEC, they are likely rooted in the military’s confidence in its capacity to hold at least partial elections in some townships. More elections could be canceled later if the Tatmadaw fails to expand its control. As pointed out by the Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar, the junta has “[fused] political manoeuvres – including elections – with military strategy9”. This means that election preparations and offensives by the Tatmadaw are taking place concurrently to achieve maximum control in townships identified by the UEC for each election phase. This concentration of manpower and military action is likely to result in less, rather than more, security for civilians. Civilian populations will bear the cost as military operations, including airstrikes, will be deployed across the country to support elections held on a rolling basis. Each election phase will create more instability and insecurity and cause more casualties. For more: • DMG, “Junta imposes martial law in 63 resistance-held townships”, 1 August 2025, https://www.dmediag.com/news/ jimli.html • DVB, “Regime elections to be held in 267 townships; Sixteen arrested, including six-year-old, for killing retired general”, 9 June 2025, https://english.dvb.no/regime-elections-to-be-held-in-267- 9 ISP-Myanmar, “Prospective 4th Generation Tatmadaw – Pathways to Reform or Further Regression?”, 2 September 2025, https://ispmyanmar.com/op-27/ 31