dissolved (Bunte, 2017). This is an example of the ways in which the Tatmadaw regimes simply deleted individuals as well as facets of the government in order to maintain their hold. Furthermore the purging of Khin Nyunt demonstrates the immense power of the Tatmadaw, enabling it to simply erase aspects of Burmese political life that were not conducive to its overarching goals without any serious public scrutiny or recourse. The early-to-mid 1990s also saw tensions between the Tatmadaw in Rangoon and regional commanders who held the autonomy to execute their own administrative affairs and military activities; The power of these “warlords” was subsequently “re-centralized” by requiring regional commanders to serve as members of the junta and by regularly assigning regional commanders to positions in the War Office and the cabinet in Rangoon. (Bunte, 2017, p. 20) In carrying out these strategic exercises, the military was able to once again merge its control by gaining the cooperation of regional political and military figureheads (in some instances against their will). This gave the Tatmadaw top echelon an entrance into Burma’s ethnic regions, ultimately easing their push to near total control over every one of the nation’s territories. Much like the Caretaker Government, the SLORC/SPDC regime also took part in active reconfiguring the social and cultural life of the civilian population as a way to ensure its own survival and economic ambitions. The opening of Dagon University is a prime example of the State’s fascination with dictating the social livelihoods of those it governs. Established in 1993, Dagon University catered to students who attended Rangoon (Yangon) University in the central part of the city. This was a systematic scheme by the ruling junta to disperse students, effectively cutting them off from one another and away from the main population of central Rangoon, driven by the paranoia 40