Public USDA membership was based on pragmatism rather than actual ideological beliefs, as it was necessary in order to secure favors for business reasons (Seekins, 2011). Special privileges were also given to members of the USDA, “such as free courses for members in subjects like computer science or foreign languages” (Seekins, 2011, p. 158). In reality, the association was a coercive apparatus used to incite negative sentiment toward Aung San Suu Kyi and the democracy movement she was spearheading at the time. The USDA was also able to gain closer access to the minds of the public, as Seekins (2011) explains: The association distribute[d] money for local development projects such as provision of running water to city neighborhoods or the installation of telephones; one observer compares it to Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, which stayed in power over five decades through pork-barrel politics. He reports that it [the USDA] is very effective in ‘penetrating civil society,’ controlling most ward-level Peace and Development Councils and paying their members. This places the group in an ideal position to form political parties and participate in the general election. . .under the new, military backed constitution. (p. 158) Although the role of the USDA has shifted with regard to its relationship with the military, namely, its reconfiguration into the Union Solidarity and Development Party, it remained a patronage device which directly benefited the top echelon of the state for decades to come. The intelligence apparatus of the SLORC government played a crucial role in further tightening controls on the civilian population as well as Burma’s international profile. As mentioned by V. Boudreau (2004), at the time of the Four Eights rebellion, the SLORC quickly undertook a campaign of propaganda in an attempt to prevent further civil unrest from breaking out. Intelligence head Khin Nyunt gave multiple press conferences presenting the SLORC and the pacification of the Four Eights in a favorable 38