A/HRC/39/CRP.2 103. Importantly, for nearly three decades all Special Rapporteurs have stressed that systemic impunity for human rights violations and abuses was a critical obstacle to the realization of human rights in Myanmar and had contributed to or compounded recurrent patterns of violations.135 104. Allegations of serious human rights violations and abuses have continued in the period since 2011. These are the focus of this report. IV. Emblematic situation 1: Kachin and Shan States 105. The Mission focused its fact-finding work on three emblematic situations: the hostilities and other military conduct in Kachin and Shan States and their human rights impact; the crisis in Rakhine State in all its facets; and infringements on the exercise of fundamental freedoms. In the context of the latter issue, it also examined the prevalence of “hate speech”. 106. Since 2011, the decades old conflicts in Kachin and Shan States have escalated, with episodes of intense fighting between the Tatmadaw and “ethnic armed organizations” (EAOs), as well as incidents of non-State armed groups fighting each other. In June 2011, a 17-year ceasefire between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Tatmadaw broke down. In Shan State, the conflicts have been characterised by a complex patchwork of armed actors and shifting territorial control. The Mission has amassed information regarding the conduct of hostilities in the context of several of these conflicts and their human rights and humanitarian impact on the civilian population. It verified a number of incidents in the context of these armed conflicts and confirmed consistent patterns of violations of international law. 107. Despite attempts to sign peace agreements with some of the EAOs since 1961, several groups have been ostracized from the peace process, and hostilities have continued even with some parties to the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The NCA was signed on 12 October 2015 with eight EAOs. Groups that have not signed include the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) 136 and the Arakan Army (AA). Among the groups currently involved in hostilities in Kachin and Shan States, only the Shan State ArmySouth (SSA-S)137 signed the NCA but clashes continue between it and the Tatmadaw, parallel to the peace process. The Shan State Army-North (SSA-N)138 has not yet signed the NCA. The NLD-Government has led a peace process, the “Union Peace Conference-21st Century Panglong”; sessions have been held in August 2016, May 2017 and July 2018. The Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee (FPNCC) is currently the most powerful umbrella coalition of EAOs,139 attempting to unite these groups in their negotiations with the central Government. Progress has been slow. 108. All EAOs operating in Kachin and Shan States share a common opponent, the Tatmadaw. Most EAOs have forged cooperative links with each other. The AA, the MNDAA, the KIA and the TNLA collaborate as the Northern Alliance (and are all member of the FPNCC). The Tatmadaw is fighting with the KIA, TNLA, SSA-S, SSA-N and MNDAA and with the Northern Alliance. Since November 2015, the SSA-S and the TNLA have also been fighting each other with the level of intensity rising to a non-international armed conflict. Various militia groups are also involved in the conflicts, mostly alongside the Tatmadaw. 135 136 137 138 139 30 E,g. reports of Special Rapporteur Sergio Pinheiro, including A/61/369 (para. 27-33), in which he discussed several manifestations of impunity. Also E/CN.4/1999/35, para. 78; A/62/233, para. 30. Armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF). Armed wing of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS). Armed wing of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP). The FPNCC is comprised of seven member-organizations including the six armed groups active in Shan and Kachin States: AA (United League of Arakan), KIA, MNDAA, TNLA, SSA-N, and the United Wa State Army (UWSA).