A/HRC/39/CRP.2 notice. One witness said that people had gone to the shops as usual, but had then discovered that the Hindu families had left.2571 1141. The Mission notes, that the breakdown of intercommunal relationships, as well as the warnings given by some ethnic Rakhine to their neighbours, and the departure of other groups in advance of the violence, may indicate that some non-Rohingya were informed of or aware of the upcoming plans of the Tatmadaw regarding the impending “clearance operations”. 1142. In some locations, ethnic Rakhine village chairpersons, who were particularly aggressive towards the Rohingya, contributed to the further breakdown of relationships. For example, many accounts indicate that the relationship between the Rohingya and their ethnic Rakhine neighbours in Min Gyi (Tula Toli) had initially been amicable. Relations began to deteriorate when a new chairman was elected in 2015, and continued to worsen through 2017, including through severely restricted access to the market in a nearby village. 2572 1143. During this period, the Myanmar authorities made increasing efforts to recruit ethnic Rakhine as members of the security apparatus. In November 2016, the Chief of the Rakhine State Police reportedly stated that his police force was recruiting a new “Regional Police” from among ethnic Rakhine and other non-Muslim ethnic minorities living in Maungdaw Township to serve in their own villages. 2573 It was reported that they intended to provide the recruits with weapons, other equipment, and compensation. 2574 On 17 November 2016, Myanmar police authorities officially reported that 116 new police members had started “special” four-month security training “to protect local people from various forms of crimes”. Recruits would receive training in martial arts, weapon use, and riot control tactics. The announcement continued, “Every Rakhine national wishing to protect their state will have a chance to become part of the local armed police”.2575 This auxiliary police force, which would wear police uniforms, was to fall under the command of the BGP, which ultimately falls under control of the Tatmadaw during military operations. 2576 1144. Moreover, the recruitment of non-Rohingya to Government-supported militias, known as Pyi Thu Sit (“People’s Army”), continued throughout this period in Rakhine State.2577 The Government appears to have supported the establishment of Pyi Thu Sit after the violence of 2012,2578 and they were subsequently set up in specific village tracts in northern Rakhine State, armed by the Government and provided with uniforms and training.2579 Often, Rohingya villagers could identify Pyi Thu Sit participants, either because they knew them, or because they were recognisable from some type of adapted military uniform distinguishing them from the Tatmadaw or police.2580 1145. Independent of Pyi Thu Sit, the Myanmar authorities also mobilised and armed other Rakhine militia groups after October 2016.2581 One interviewee stated that these groups did not have uniforms.2582 Another villager, a village administrator, stated that he saw weapons being transported by the Tatmadaw and handed out to ethnic Rakhine. 2583 The Government has confirmed the establishment of these “new” militias during a parliamentary debate in 2571 2572 2573 2574 2575 2576 2577 2578 2579 2580 2581 2582 2583 QI-111, QI-112. QI-058, QI-059, QI-060, QI-066, QI-067. V-153, V-154. V-153. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Ministry of Information, “Police training aims to raise security in Rakhine State,” (17 November 2016), http://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/?q=news/18/11/2016/id-9208 V-165. Constitution of Myanmar, s. 340, although this would require the approval of the National Defence and Security Council. V-164. LI-052, LI-101, LI-103, LI-104, LI-118, YI-009. LI-052, LI-104, LI-118. LI-054, LI-101, LI-103, YI-009. YI-009. LI-101. 269