A/HRC/39/CRP.2 responsible for acts of terrorism and the attacks conducted by ARSA treated as crimes that qualify as offences under Myanmar’s Penal Code or the 2014 Counter-Terrorism Law.2360 1043. ARSA stated that the 2017 attacks were in response to what it viewed as increased oppression of the Rohingya over the previous weeks and months, including arbitrary arrests and interrogations, extortion, increasing restrictions on freedom of movement, and disappearances. A “blockade” of Rohingya in Zay Di Pyin, Rathedaung Township, appears to have had a particular impact.2361 On 15 August 2017, Ata Ullah appeared in a video, with four armed fighters, warning the Myanmar military to stop committing abuses. He spoke about the longstanding suffering and oppression of the Rohingya, and urged the Myanmar Government to stop the Zay Di Pyin “blockade”.2362 1044. ARSA further stated that the “ramping up” of the military in northern Rakhine State and the increasing oppression by the Tatmadaw and other security forces in early August 2017 were an attempt to “derail” the work and recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, led by former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan.2363 The final report of the Commission2364 set out solutions for peace and development in Rakhine State and included a series of recommendations, for example on citizenship for the Rohingya.2365 The ARSA attacks commenced hours after the release of the Commission’s final report in Yangon on 24 August 2017. 1045. ARSA denied that its attacks were linked to the Advisory Commission report. They may have been prompted by an accidental IED explosion on 25 August, raising concerns among ARSA leadership that the Tatmadaw would be alerted to their activities.2366 It appears that, shortly after this explosion, an order was sent through a messaging application telling ARSA “cell” leaders to mobilise male villagers. 2367 However, this accidental explosion only appears to have brought forward plans by one to two days. 1046. ARSA was able to carry out multiple, coordinated attacks in a highly controlled and militarised environment, but with little military capability. The attacks employed “hit and run” tactics with predominantly untrained civilians, mostly wielding sticks and knives. The ARSA attacks caused minimal Tatmadaw casualties compared to their own losses. 1047. It appears, therefore, that the objectives of the ARSA attacks may not have been military, but aimed at eliciting a response by the Tatmadaw (as in October 2016), with the broader goal of drawing renewed global attention to the Rohingya situation.2368 As one ARSA member stated: The main aim of the attacks was to get international attention, as we knew the response [of the Tatmadaw] would be brutal. We hoped that, if the world could see their response, they would finally understand our suffering.2369 1048. Some ARSA members noted an instruction not to use weapons against the Tatmadaw in the 2017 attacks, as the purpose of the attack was in fact to draw attention to the Rohingya cause.2370 While it is not known whether this instruction was followed by all, given that some weapons were used, it adds weight to the conclusion that the operation was aimed at drawing attention, rather than any military success. 1049. Another ARSA participant in the August 2017 attacks characterized it as follows: 2360 2361 2362 2363 2364 2365 2366 2367 2368 2369 2370 V-120. See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build-up to 25 August 2017. XI-007, V-101. ARSA statement, 25 August 2017 (https://twitter.com/ARSA_Official/status/900904120076435457). V-119. BM-025, V-117. CI-140, LI-121, QI-099, XI-008. V-068. CI-137, CI-140, XI-008, XI-009, EM-001. XI-008. CI-137, CI-140. 249