A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Potential members were initially asked to undertake sentry duty for their village, and subsequently sometimes to join the attacks.2307 1025. While joining ARSA may largely have been voluntary, 2308 credible public reports indicate that ARSA used intimidation and coercion and pressure, as well as its influence in the community, to push people into joining its ranks. 2309 Boys under the age of 18 were a1so recruited, and participated in activities.2310 One man mobilised directly prior to the 2017 attacks explained: On the night of the attack, I wasn’t informed in advance. The leader came to my house at around 3.30am and told me to come and fight. I felt unsure but I felt pressured to go as they were in my house.2311 1026. It appears that some members were able to leave ARSA. 2312 One member who participated in the October 2016 attacks was shot in the hand by the Tatmadaw. He believed that ARSA was going to provide better support in the attack itself in terms of participants and weapons. He was surprised by the lack of backup, as well as the violent response by the military, and so renounced his membership. He noted that “there was not a problem not rejoining”.2313 1027. A level of secrecy surrounded ARSA membership. Members and supporters did not necessarily know who else was affiliated, even within the same village. An oath of secrecy appears to have been required,2314 with members stating that they had been required to promise not to talk about ARSA or betray it. 2315 This seems to have been a strategy to protect members, given the Tatmadaw’s interest in ARSA activities.2316 1028. Although ARSA denies having any links with foreign terrorist organizations, 2317 it was reported after the 25 August 2017 attacks that international Islamist terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda called for public support for the Rohingya.2318 This appears to have been unsolicited. The following day, ARSA issued a press release explicitly rejecting links to AlQaeda, the Islamic State (Daesh or ISIS), Lashkar-e-Taiba and all other transnational terrorist groups, noting that they “do not welcome the involvement of these groups in the Arakan conflict”.2319 The ill-equipped nature of ARSA, as outlined below, lends credibility to those claims,2320 and the Mission has seen no information that would suggest such links. ARSA has, however, received financial support from the Rohingya diaspora.2321 Training and weaponry 1029. Training received by ARSA members and supporters varied greatly. A core group of ARSA members received some military training, including in weaponry. 2322 Some who had received weapons training then replicated it for others, although often without weapons, by 2307 2308 2309 2310 2311 2312 2313 2314 2315 2316 2317 2318 2319 2320 2321 2322 LI-054, LI-074, LI-124, YI-010. CI-137, CI-140, LI-054, LI-074, LI-124, QI-103, QI-100, XI-008. LI-054, XI-009, QM-013, V-098. CI-137, XI-008. LI-054. LI-054, LI-089. LI-089. LI-054, QI-102, LM-007, V-159. LI-054, QI-102, WI-044, BM-003, LM-007. BM-003, EM-001, QM-013. ARSA, Statement, ARSA/PR/12/2017, 14 September 2017, XI-007, XI-008, BM-025, V-099, V-100 V-101, See also Official Video of ARSA, 18 August 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJoWeV1DlFM&feature=youtu.be; V-254, V-255. ARSA, Statement, ARSA/PR/12/2017, 14 September 2017. BM-049. BM-003, BM-025, QM-013, V-094. CI-140, QI-099, BM-049. 245