A/HRC/39/CRP.2 1019. The political wing of ARSA is made up of five people who live outside Myanmar and who are authorised to represent the organization. 2292 They appear to have responsibility for the political and media strategy of the organization, including the public statements issued on ARSA’s Twitter feed. Since the October 2016 attacks, ARSA has issued at least 31 written press releases, as well as videos and messages on Twitter. 2293 1020. The number of ARSA members and supporters has varied over time. The three 2016 attacks were carried out by a small group of fighters. 2294 However, their relative success was a turning point in terms of support. The publicity garnered by the Government’s response increased ARSA’s visibility, both domestically and internationally, which encouraged Rohingya men to support ARSA, and for some to formally join it. 2295 Moreover, the 9 October 2016 violence led to the first series of Tatmadaw “clearance operations” and triggered an increase in the oppressive, discriminatory and abusive treatment of the Rohingya by the Myanmar authorities.2296 As a result, between October 2016 and August 2017, ARSA grew stronger in both its membership and its support base.2297 1021. The number of ARSA members and supporters varied from village to village, with information indicating that there may have been at least ten ARSA supporters in each village tract where they were active.2298 However, the extent of their reach was not consistent across all villages in the three townships of northern Rakhine. 2299 1022. Total numbers of members and supporters are difficult to ascertain. The actual membership seems to have been small but the support base was certainly in the hundreds. This includes the “last minute” mobilization of many Rohingya, with many of those who participated in the 25 August 2017 attacks mobilized only shortly before that day or on the day itself.2300 However, overall membership and support for ARSA represented a minority of the total population. 1023. Supporters claim to be motivated by the need to fight long-standing discrimination against the Rohingya and the denial of human rights. 2301 Some had personally suffered oppression and abuse by the Tatmadaw or other security forces. 2302 One young man said he joined ARSA after having been tortured over a period of days while detained by the Tatmadaw following the October 2016 violence.2303 Another man saw his mother and brother killed in the 2012 violence and, as a result of this experience, as well as other oppressive measures, he joined ARSA: The military’s goal was to kill us all. Because of all these abuses, we decided to try to protect ourselves. We needed to establish a group to defend our rights.2304 1024. ARSA retained a strong Muslim identity as a Rohingya group, and recruitment at the village level was sometimes conducted through local religious leaders. This may have been due to their influence among the Rohingya population, rather than their religious function per se.2305 Religious scholars, known as Moluvis, approached potential supporters, often outside mosques, particularly in the months prior to the 2016 and 2017 ARSA attacks. 2306 2292 2293 2294 2295 2296 2297 2298 2299 2300 2301 2302 2303 2304 2305 2306 244 ARSA, Appointment of Official Representatives, ARSA/PR/21/2017, on 16 November 2017. See: https://twitter.com/ARSA_Official V-094 CI-137, LI-121, LI-124, QI-102, XI-007. See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build-up to 25 August 2017. LI-121, BM-025. CI-140, LI-054, QI-099, QI-103, YI-029. BM-025. CI-140, LI-054, LI-121, QI-103, XI-007, BM-003, BM-029, BM-049, QM-013, V-079. CI-140, LI-121, LI-124, QI-099, QI-100, XI-007, XI-008, BM-024. CI-137, CI-140, LI-122, QI-103. QI-103. LI-122. LI-124, BM-025. LI-054, LI-089, LI-124.