respect: the military declared a state of emergency, dissolved the parliament, detained the NLD’s top leadership and restricted human and civil rights. Those measures led to mass civilian protests against the coup, which were brutally suppressed by the junta. Hundreds of protesters were killed and thousands arrested, whereupon the violence escalated in almost every part of the country. The NLD not only called for armed resistance against the military by forming People’s Defence Force (PDF) units; it also sought to ally itself with the armed opposition groups of ethnic minorities – the so-called ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) – in the border regions of the country. For decades now, the EAOs have been fighting to secure minority rights, regional autonomy and the federalisation of state power. It is a struggle that is directed against both the central government and the military and does not shy from using armed force. Since spring 2021, a large number of armed groups have been fighting the junta in many parts of the country. Some of those groups are associated with the exiled National Unity Government (NUG), which is dominated by the NLD, while others have no connection to it. In some respects, the armed groups differ significantly – for example, in terms of ideological orientation (ranging from authoritarian and ethnonationalist to liberal-democratic), goals (from secession and the formation of autonomous authoritarian enclaves to democratic federalism), size (from a few dozen to tens of thousands of fighters) and armament (from homemade rifles to artillery and combat drones). And, at times, those groups – which often have little more in common than the rejection of the coup and the military government – start fighting one another. Myanmar’s current “polycrisis” While the number of armed conflicts in Myanmar fell by 17 per cent nationwide in 2025 compared with the previous year, this is to be attributed mainly to a significant SWP Comment 9 February 2026 2 decline in the fighting in the centre of the country, primarily in Sagaing State, as a result of massive military operations. Other states, such as Rakhine and Kayin, saw a significant increase in the fighting on their territory. It is estimated that the junta currently controls only about 30–40 per cent of the country. The border regions, in particular, remain under the control of various opposition groups that have established parallel state structures (including their own tax collection, administration and security forces). According to estimates, more than 90,000 people have been victims of the civil war since 2021 (more than 15,000 in 2025 alone), while 3.5 million have been internally displaced and more than 1.5 million have left the country. Bangladesh is home to the world’s largest refugee camp for displaced Rohingya from Myanmar, who have no prospect of returning at present. Thailand and India are hosting a large number of refugees, too; for its part, New Delhi has begun building a fence along the border with Myanmar to stem the flow. Well over a third of Myanmar’s population (some 18 million people) depend on humanitarian aid. In the United Nations (UN) Hunger Hotspots 2025 report, Myanmar is classified as a hotspot “of very high concern” because millions of residents are threatened by acute food insecurity. Almost half of the population now lives below the national poverty line – before the coup, it was just under a quarter. Moreover, large parts of the country’s infrastructure have been destroyed or damaged as a result of the fighting; and important economic sectors such as tourism, manufacturing and construction lie in ruins. Foreign direct investment has fallen by 74 per cent since the coup. Further, organised crime is rampant, especially drug production and trafficking, and there are numerous scam centres at which large-scale internet fraud is carried out through the use of forced labour, torture and extortion. According to the Global Organized Crime Index, Myanmar is currently the country most affected by organised crime.