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38 Telenor Myanmar (2021), 'Telenor Group sells Telenor Myanmar to M1 Group,' Telenor website, 8 July, [accessed online], https:// www.telenor.com/media/newsroom/telenor-group-sells-telenor-myanmar-to-m1-group/ 39 Justice For Myanmar (2021), 'Military linked company Shwe Byain Phyu has taken control of Telenor Myanmar,' Justice For Myanmar website, [accessed online], https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/press-releases/military-linked-company-shwe-byain-phyu-has-takencontrol-of-telenor-myanmar 40 Ibid. 41 Ooredoo (2023), ‘Ooredoo Q.P.S.C: Group structure and presence,' Ooredoo website, 8 May, [accessed online], https:// www.ooredoo.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Ownership-structure-.pdf 42 Human Rights Watch (2013), 'Letter to Dr. Nasser Marafih, CEO Ooredoo,' Human Rights Watch website, 3 May, [accessed online], https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/03/letter-dr-nasser-marafih-ceo-ooredoo; MCRB, IHRB and DIHR (2015), ‘Myanmar ICT Sector-Wide Impact Assessment,' Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business website, September [accessed online], https://www.myanmarresponsiblebusiness.org/pdf/SWIA/ICT/complete.pdf 43 Ooredoo (2022), 'Ooredoo Group announces the sale of its telecom business in Myanmar to Nine Communications Pte Ltd at an enterprise value of USD 576 million,' Ooredoo website, 8 September, [accessed online], https://www.ooredoo.com/en/media/news_view/ ooredoo-group-announces-the-sale-of-its-telecom-business-in-myanmar-to-nine-communications-pte-ltd-at-an-enterprise-value-ofusd-576-million/ 44 Ooredoo (2025), 'Ooredoo Group achieves sustainable growth reflecting operational strength and strategic investments,' Ooredoo website, 30 July, [accessed online], https://www.ooredoo.com/en/media/news_view/ooredoo-group-achieves-sustainable-growthreflecting-operational-strength-and-strategic-investments/ 45 'Overview,' Frontiir website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https://www.frontiir.com/about_us/overview/; ‘Founder and Co- Founders,' Frontiir website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https://www.frontiir.com/about_us/governance-of-frontiir/ 46 Nick Mathiason and Christian Eriksson (2020), 'Revealed: UK's overseas aid fund is major investor in company linked to media crackdown in Myanmar,' Finance Uncovered website, 9 June, [accessed online], https://www.financeuncovered.org/stories/revealed-uksoverseas-aid-fund-is-major-investor-in-company-linked-to-media-crackdown-in-myanmar 47 Caroline Henshaw and Aung Naing (2025), 'British Norwegian and Danish governments back internet provider in military run Myanmar which hosts notorious Chinese surveillance system,' Finance Uncovered website, 21 May, [accessed online], https:// www.financeuncovered.org/stories/british-norwegian-and-danish-governments-back-internet-provider-in-military-run-myanmar-whichhosts-notorious-chinese-surveillance-system 48 MOTC (2017), 'Telecommunication Licence Issued List,' Ministry of Transport and Communications Myanmar website, 6 July, [accessed online], https://www.motc.gov.mm/sites/default/files/Telecommunication%20Licence%20Issued%20List%20%285-7-2017%29PDF.pdf 49 James Pearce (2018), 'Campana raises 40M to fund network expansion in ASEAN region,' Capacity Media website, 18 September, [accessed online], https://www.capacitymedia.com/article/29ot42ikril15nn07ww4o/news/campana-raises-40m-to-fund-networkexpansion-in-asean-region 50 ZMS (2023), 'First Singapore private submarine cable project to start facilities in Myanmar,' ZMS Cable website, 29 January, [accessed online], https://m.zmscable.com/new/First-Singapore-Private-Submarine-Cable-Project-To-Start-Facilities-In-Myanmar 51 Ramakrishna Padmanabhan, Arturo Filastò, Maria Xynou, Ram Sundara Raman, Kennedy Middleton, Mingwei Zhang, Doug Madory, Molly Roberts, and Alberto Dainotti (2021), ‘A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar,' Ramakrishnan SR website, 27 August, [accessed online], https://ramakrishnansr.com/assets/myanmar.pdf 52 Ministry of Science and Technology (2017), 'VNPT launches StreamNet in Myanmar,' Vietnam’s Ministry of Science and Technology website, 30 October, [accessed online], https://english.mic.gov.vn/vnpt-launches-streamnet-in-myanmar-197135901.htm 53 Justice For Myanmar (2020), ‘Nodes of Corruption, Lines of Abuse,' op. cit. 54 Trung Ngoc (2017), 'Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Group invests abroad to set up a JV in Myanmar,' The Leader Vietnam website, 1 November, [accessed online], https://e.theleader.vn/vietnam-posts-and-telecommunications-group-invests-abroad-to-set-upa-jv-in-myanmar-d2853.html 41

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Silk Road of Surveillance: The role of China's Geedge Networks and Myanmar telecommunications operators in the junta's digital terror campaign

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Burmese
English

Topic

Digital Rights
Digital Surveillance
Internet Restrictions
Military Coup

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Justice for Myanmar

Date Published: Sep 9, 2025

Abstract: A new leaked dataset reveals the Chinese company Geedge Networks’ business in Myanmar and exposes a significant number of telecommunications companies that are implementing sophisticated surveillance and censorship technology on behalf of the illegal Myanmar military junta. The leaked dataset offers detailed insights into the inner workings of Chinese internet surveillance and censorship technology that is exported to Myanmar by a company that frames its work as associated with China's Belt and Road Initiative. The dataset has been reviewed by a coalition of media and non-governmental/civil society organisations through the Great Firewall Export project made up of Amnesty International, InterSecLab, the Globe and Mail, Paper Trail Media, Tor Project, DER STANDARD, and Follow The Money. The Internet in Myanmar since the military’s February 2021 illegal coup attempt is among the most restricted in the world. The rolling out of a commercialised version of China’s Great Firewall gives the junta unprecedented access to and control over the online activities of 33.4 million internet users in Myanmar. Notably, the hardware, software and support provided by Geedge Networks to the Myanmar military junta enables the tracking of network traffic at the individual level and can identify the geographic location of mobile subscribers in real time by linking their activity to specific cell identifiers (cell IDs). As such, the junta has an enhanced capability to effectively track down, arrest, torture and kill human rights defenders, journalists and revolutionary forces across the country. The military junta can do so with the direct assistance of telecommunications companies in Myanmar exposed in the dataset – including ATOM (formerly Telenor Myanmar), Mytel, Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), Ooredoo Myanmar, Frontiir, StreamNet , Golden TMH Telecom, Internet Maekhong Network (IM-Net), Myanmar Broadband Telecom (MBT), Myanmar Telecommunication Network (MTN), Campana, Global Technology Group and China Unicom – that are integral to the set-up of a national firewall for the Myanmar junta. This investigation into the business dealings of Geedge Networks with the Myanmar junta builds on a June 2024 report by Justice For Myanmar into how Geedge was initiating country-wide internet surveillance and censorship through the junta-controlled Information Technology and Cyber Security Department (ITCSD) of the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC). 1 By providing hardware and software to the illegal Myanmar military junta, Geedge may be aiding and abetting in the commission of crimes against humanity, including the acts of torture and killing, carried out by members of the junta within a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. Further investigation is required on this. In the meantime, Geedge Networks is limiting the rights to freedom of expression, association, and digital movement of the people of Myanmar. For that reason, Geedge Networks should be targeted with international sanctions, and individuals in directive and leadership positions within the company should be investigated for aiding and abetting violations of international human rights laws and potentially also international crimes. Telecommunications companies identified in the Geedge dataset as supporting the junta’s online surveillance machinery should be held to account for the serious risks of online and offline violence, and de facto harms such as arrests, torture and killings, of Myanmar civilians. Geedge Networks is closely affiliated with the Chinese state and export of its systems to Myanmar align with the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s involvement in the mass surveillance and repression of the civilian population in Myanmar is part of a broader pattern in which the Chinese government remains a principal supplier of arms to the Myanmar junta, aiding and abetting the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

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Silk Road of Surveillance: The role of China's Geedge Networks and Myanmar telecommunications operators in the junta's digital terror campaign

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