Previous 40 / 47 Next

Appendix: Geedge deployment in Myanmar Month/ Junta Telecommunications Year companies Jan 2022 Early Operational Stage: Six operators carried out log analysis in Yangon. The four largest ISP sites: MPT, ATOM, Ooredoo, and Mytel, and the two largest fibre optic operators: Frontiir and Campana, returned feedback to address incomplete traffic and event log collection across sites to improve network visibility and policy enforcement accuracy. June 2022 Proof of Concept (POC): Geedge Networks (the provider) gave test procedures for TSG testing; POC lasts approximately 6 months. NCSC engineers received training during the POC. Provider gave two-day training on TSG architecture, policy enforcement, system logs, reports, customised signature function and VPN blocking. Joint troubleshooting and maintenance with NCSC engineers. POC Environment Survey: Provider visited MPT and NCSC, checked internet topology, network interfaces, machine room; shared hardware, power and deployment documentation. Hardware and Software Deployment: Installed TSG hardware at MPT and NCSC; set up software and prepared POC environment at NCSC conference room. Initial tests: Provider introduced system functions, presented 18 test cases, explained VPN blocking; NCSC presented test cases to MOTC head. July 2022 VPN/Application Blocking Demonstration: Demo of TSG VPN blocking with 12 VPNs using signatures, captured and imported VPN traffic signatures into TSG. Additional VPN Blocking Demo: Blocked paid VPN applications including NordVPN and ProtonVPN. Rate Limiting Presentation: Presented rate limiting of YouTube on PC and smartphone. Aug-Sept 2022 Function Testing by NCSC: NCSC tested full TSG functionality for MOTC. Oct 2022 Control Features Presentation: Presented control of Psiphon, VPNs, and Viber voice calls per NCSC requirements. Nov 2022 Proof of Concept ends: Training during contract execution. Provider offered ongoing training on operation, management, and maintenance of all supplied equipment and software. 37

Select target paragraph3

● ● ●

Silk Road of Surveillance: The role of China's Geedge Networks and Myanmar telecommunications operators in the junta's digital terror campaign

Report

Preview

Language

Burmese
English

Topic

Digital Rights
Digital Surveillance
Internet Restrictions
Military Coup

Author(s)

Justice for Myanmar

Date Published: Sep 9, 2025

Abstract: A new leaked dataset reveals the Chinese company Geedge Networks’ business in Myanmar and exposes a significant number of telecommunications companies that are implementing sophisticated surveillance and censorship technology on behalf of the illegal Myanmar military junta. The leaked dataset offers detailed insights into the inner workings of Chinese internet surveillance and censorship technology that is exported to Myanmar by a company that frames its work as associated with China's Belt and Road Initiative. The dataset has been reviewed by a coalition of media and non-governmental/civil society organisations through the Great Firewall Export project made up of Amnesty International, InterSecLab, the Globe and Mail, Paper Trail Media, Tor Project, DER STANDARD, and Follow The Money. The Internet in Myanmar since the military’s February 2021 illegal coup attempt is among the most restricted in the world. The rolling out of a commercialised version of China’s Great Firewall gives the junta unprecedented access to and control over the online activities of 33.4 million internet users in Myanmar. Notably, the hardware, software and support provided by Geedge Networks to the Myanmar military junta enables the tracking of network traffic at the individual level and can identify the geographic location of mobile subscribers in real time by linking their activity to specific cell identifiers (cell IDs). As such, the junta has an enhanced capability to effectively track down, arrest, torture and kill human rights defenders, journalists and revolutionary forces across the country. The military junta can do so with the direct assistance of telecommunications companies in Myanmar exposed in the dataset – including ATOM (formerly Telenor Myanmar), Mytel, Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), Ooredoo Myanmar, Frontiir, StreamNet , Golden TMH Telecom, Internet Maekhong Network (IM-Net), Myanmar Broadband Telecom (MBT), Myanmar Telecommunication Network (MTN), Campana, Global Technology Group and China Unicom – that are integral to the set-up of a national firewall for the Myanmar junta. This investigation into the business dealings of Geedge Networks with the Myanmar junta builds on a June 2024 report by Justice For Myanmar into how Geedge was initiating country-wide internet surveillance and censorship through the junta-controlled Information Technology and Cyber Security Department (ITCSD) of the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC). 1 By providing hardware and software to the illegal Myanmar military junta, Geedge may be aiding and abetting in the commission of crimes against humanity, including the acts of torture and killing, carried out by members of the junta within a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. Further investigation is required on this. In the meantime, Geedge Networks is limiting the rights to freedom of expression, association, and digital movement of the people of Myanmar. For that reason, Geedge Networks should be targeted with international sanctions, and individuals in directive and leadership positions within the company should be investigated for aiding and abetting violations of international human rights laws and potentially also international crimes. Telecommunications companies identified in the Geedge dataset as supporting the junta’s online surveillance machinery should be held to account for the serious risks of online and offline violence, and de facto harms such as arrests, torture and killings, of Myanmar civilians. Geedge Networks is closely affiliated with the Chinese state and export of its systems to Myanmar align with the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s involvement in the mass surveillance and repression of the civilian population in Myanmar is part of a broader pattern in which the Chinese government remains a principal supplier of arms to the Myanmar junta, aiding and abetting the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Link: source

Primary Documents

Silk+Road+of+Surveillance+EN.pdf
English
Download View
68bf940e16f5d1a5366ed274_Silk Road of Surveillance Exec Summary MM.pdf
Burmese
Download View

Myanmar Internet Project

Select target paragraph3

Silk Road of Surveillance: The role of China's Geedge Networks and Myanmar telecommunications operators in the junta's digital terror campaign

Primary Documents

Notifications