Russia. This campaign uploaded content in Russian that was critical of Ukraine’s Updates from Threat Analysis Group (TAG) government and supportive of Russia. We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iraq. This campaign uploaded content in Arabic that was supportive of Iran-backed militias and critical of the U.S. and its allies. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook. We terminated 7 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Jordan. This campaign uploaded content in Arabic that was supportive of the Jordanian government and critical of its opposition. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook. We terminated 15 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Algeria. This campaign uploaded content in Arabic that was supportive of the Algerian government and its military. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook. We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation. We terminated 6 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Mexico. This campaign uploaded content in Spanish that was critical of certain local politicians in Campeche, Mexico. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook. We terminated 4 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Mexico. This campaign uploaded content in Spanish that was supportive of a member of the National Action Party. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook. We terminated 16 YouTube channels and 1 ads account as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Sudan. This campaign uploaded content in Arabic that was supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and critical of the current Sudanese government. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook. We terminated 850 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle. A very small OK subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China’s COVID-19 vaccine efforts Google serves cookies to analyze traffic to this site. Information about your use of our site is shared with and social issues in the U.S. These findings are consistent with our previous reports. Google for that purpose. See details. August