10.2 BILLS AND PROPOSALS In the case studies discussed earlier, several bills were identified that propose different solutions to tackle disinformation. There are instances that include prison terms (Costa Rica, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile) or sanctions and fines (Paraguay) for the creation and dissemination of disinformation. Some provide for requirements around content moderation (Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina), due process and the right to respond (Mexico, Brazil), rules for public agents (Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina), and the reform of electoral legislation to include mechanisms regarding disinformation (Colombia and Brazil). In Brazil, Bill 2630 gained support even though it does not contain concrete prohibitive treatment of disinformation. It does contain transparency provisions and prohibitions against certain related behaviors, such as unidentified automated accounts and inauthentic behavior. It also specifies mechanisms to expand data collection and calls for the creation of a council with the prerogative of drafting a code of conduct that provides for more concrete measures to combat disinformation. In Costa Rica, Bill 21187, known as the “Law to Combat Cyber Delinquency,” was presented in 2019. The proposal provides for punishment with sentences of one to four years for “those who produce or disseminate, through an informatic medium, false news capable of harming the safety and stability of the financial system and its users.” The Bill also imposes this punishment on those who “produce or disseminate, through an informatic medium, false news with the goal of influencing voters’ decisions during a national or foreign plebiscite, referendum, or electoral process.” In El Salvador, a bill introduced in March 2020 proposes a sentence of three to six years for claims regarding nonexistent disasters, accidents, or dangers and for arousing alarm among authorities or particular people (Asamblea Legislativa de El Salvador 2020). In Paraguay, Bill S-209341, presented in 2020, prescribed sanctions for conduct that, through either action or omission, endangers or affects the health of persons within the framework of epidemiological alerts or emergency situations declared by the Ministry of Public Health and Welfare or by law (Congresso do Paraguai 2020). This bill was withdrawn. In its 2020 annual report, the IACHR’s Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression questions solutions that employ the criminalization of the dissemination of disinformation: “The establishment I N FO R M ATI O N D I SO R D ER IN THE GLOBA L SOUTH or use of criminal offenses to punish disinformation or dissemination of false news could have a strong chilling effect on the dissemination of ideas, criticism and information” (Vaca 2020, 222). During the workshops and interviews held for this study, and from the data collected on the methods and tools used by the actors, several concerns emerged about the risks of these responses to freedom of expression and the impacts they may have for internet users. These concerns were raised especially by civil society entities. 11. AN ANALYSIS OF ACTORS AND STRATEGIES TO COMBAT DISINFORMATION In this section, we conduct an analysis of the actors engaged in combating disinformation and the different strategies they use, based on the methods and tools employed. This evaluation is structured according to four categories: fact-checking, media education, research and information gathering, and advocacy. 11.1 CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF DISINFORMATION First, it is important to address how the actors understand disinformation, based on their conceptualization of the phenomenon. During the collection of data on the actors and their initiatives, and during the workshops and interviews, we noted differing perceptions of what constitute disinformation practices. During our research, it also became clear that disinformation is defined differently by different actors and initiatives. The absence of a clear consensus on a definition of the phenomenon makes a categorization of responses difficult. Among the actors we engaged Among the actors we engaged with, there was strong criticism with, there was strong criticism of the of the concept of “fake news” concept of “fake news” and a preference and a preference for the term for the term “disinformation.” A very “disinformation.” common aspect was the factor of deliberateness in the creation and dissemination of content (as found in the definitions used by APC and Observacom). This dimension is relevant in that it differentiates disinformation from the unintentional dissemination of content and contributes to an understanding of the problem and Latin America and the Caribbean – 1 1 1