A/80/490 against decency and humanitarian aid, attacks on the principles and values that are the foundation of the United Nations. This is a task, an obligation, for all of us who believe that our children and grandchildren deserve to live in a peaceful, rights-respecting world; a world where the rights, dignity and quality of life of people matter, no matter where they live; a world where the rule of law and human decency prevail over xenophobia, violence and bigotry. 19. Now, more than ever, it is time for all of us to stand up for the human rights of the people of Myanmar and around the world. The stakes could not be higher. II. Desperately seeking legitimacy: The junta prepares for fraudulent elections 20. An immediate, meaningful action that the international community can take to support the people of Myanmar is to unequivocally reject and denounce the charade the junta is presenting as an “election.” 21. On 31 July 2025, the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), a militarycontrolled body, lifted a nationwide state of emergency that had been in place since the 2021 military coup. At the same time, the NDSC dissolved the State Administration Council (SAC), the military’s ruling body, and replaced it with the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), a new body comprised of current and former generals. The SSPC was tasked with overseeing the junta’s plans to hold fraudulent elections, until which time it will exercise legislative, executive and judicial powers. 22. The actions of 31 July are mere cosmetic changes to reposition the junta ahead of its election ploy. They do not signal political change in Myanmar but only underscore the military’s unwillingness to countenance political dialog or reconciliation with pro-democracy forces. Tellingly, coup-leader and commander-in-chief of Myanmar’s armed forces Senior General Min Aung Hlaing sits at the head of all three bodies linked to the 31 July events: the NDSC, SAC and SSPC. Seven of the SSPC’s ten members are former members of the SAC. 23. While announcing its new incarnation, the junta reaffirmed its plans to hold a “multiparty democratic general election.” The junta subsequently announced that the election will begin on 28 December with voting in 102 of Myanmar’s 330 townships and continue into January 2026. The junta’s assertion that the election will be “democratic” is preposterous, and its plan to hold polling while it attacks and oppresses the people of Myanmar is dangerous and destabilizing. 24. The junta’s relentless attacks on political opponents and fundamental freedoms have created an environment in which a free and fair election is impossible. Former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and many other key political leaders remain behind bars. Many of the more than 22,000 political prisoners in the country are former politicians, members of political parties or political activists. The junta has criminalized freedom of expression, locking up journalists and human rights defenders who report on the junta’s actions and abuses. It has dissolved at least 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy, which won landslide victories in the last two general elections. 25. Seeking to maximize its electoral advantages, the junta has manipulated Myanmar’s legal framework and electoral system. The elections will use a mixed first-past-the-post and proportional representation system. The junta may be calculating that the introduction of proportional allocation of seats could help prevent a landslide opposition victory such as the NLD’s in 2015 and 2020 and increase the power of military-appointed MPs in a divided Parliament. 26. In January 2023, the junta adopted the Political Parties Registration Law, which replaced a previous electoral law. The new law imposes restrictive registration requirements, bars those convicted of crimes from joining political parties, and disqualifies individuals or parties associated with junta-designated “terrorist organizations.” Together, these provisions effectively purged the National League for Democracy, its leadership, and many other credible opposition parties and politicians from the political sphere. A July 2025 amendment to the law allows for the dissolution of parties accused of electoral fraud, the pretext that the military used—without providing evidence—for staging the coup after the 2020 elections. 5