A/80/490 I. Introduction 1. The crisis in Myanmar, largely invisible to most of the world, continues to worsen. Since launching a military coup in 2021, the junta has arrested, jailed, tortured and murdered tens of thousands of people in Myanmar who have openly resisted military rule. Of the nearly 30,000 arrested, more than 22,000 political prisoners remain behind bars. 2. Using sophisticated weapons of war, the junta has been escalating its attacks on civilians. Schools, clinics, monasteries, churches, mosques and the shelters of those displaced by violence have been systematically attacked by military aircraft, artillery and well-armed troops. Over 100,000 civilian homes have been destroyed in arson attacks since the coup, while at least 7,300 have been killed. Meanwhile, 21.9 million require humanitarian assistance and 16.7 million face acute food insecurity. 3. To make matters worse, a devastating earthquake struck central Myanmar on 28 March 2025, impacting an estimated 17 million people and causing nearly $11 billion in damage. The junta responded by turning a natural disaster into a humanitarian catastrophe. Junta forces blocked the delivery of humanitarian aid in areas outside of their control while threatening, harassing, interrogating and extorting relief workers. After declaring a “humanitarian ceasefire,” the junta proceeded to escalate its attacks on civilians, launching more airstrikes on civilian targets in the second quarter of 2025 than any previous quarter since the coup. 4. Now, more than ever, it is imperative that Member States of the United Nations address the root causes of violence and human suffering in Myanmar by taking steps to reduce the military junta’s capacity to commit gross human rights violations while addressing the deepening humanitarian crisis in the country. 5. There are three things that the junta needs to sustain itself and its assaults on the people of Myanmar: money, weapons and legitimacy. 6. The good news is that some governments and private institutions have taken effective action to deny the junta access to money and weapons linked to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Following a government investigation into the transfer of weapons and weapons materials from Singapore to the junta, for example, the volume of weapons-related transfers from Singapore dropped by 90 percent. Overall, international weapons transfers to the junta decreased by over a third. Bangkok Bank reported to the Special Rapporteur that it had terminated its banking relationship with Myanma Economic Bank, the key junta-controlled bank used to purchase weapons and related materials. Sanctions imposed on financial institutions by the United States in 2023 seriously disrupted military supply chains and revenue flows. 7. The bad news is that despite their effectiveness, progress on sanctions targeting the junta and its allies has stalled. Governments have been unwilling to join Canada in imposing sanctions on Myanma Economic Bank, the junta-controlled bank that is now its principal vehicle for military procurement. Member States have yet to impose sanctions on the newly constituted State Security and Peace Commission, the junta’s latest manifestation. 8. As it escalates its military operations, the junta is seeking international legitimacy by orchestrating a fraudulent general election beginning 28 December. No self-respecting democratic government or leader would accept this exercise as anything other than what it will be, a sham. A free and fair election is not possible when opposition leaders are arrested, detained, tortured or executed; when it is illegal to criticize the junta or the election; when journalists are in prison for having reported the truth. While enormous pressure will be exerted on individuals to cast ballots, few in Myanmar will accept a blatantly rigged, illegitimate election or its outcome. Violence is very likely to spike during the election period and beyond. 9. The critical question is whether the international community will accept or reject this fraudulent exercise orchestrated by an illegitimate regime. Unfortunately, too few Member States have taken a clear, public position. 3