A/80/490 and revenue streams.5 The Special Rapporteur has also lauded the actions of governments— notably Singapore’s—to crack down on arms dealing networks supplying the junta. 96. The international community, unfortunately, has failed to build on the momentum created by these actions. Only the United States and Canada have added new sanctions in 2025. New US sanctions focus on entities involved in cyberscam operations in Myanmar’s border regions and entities facilitating weapons deals with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. These actions, while important, do not strike at the heart of the junta’s attacks on civilians and oppression of the people of Myanmar. Notably, no government has added new sanctions against Myanma Economic Bank,6 the junta-controlled bank that became the junta’s primary vehicle for military procurement and repatriating foreign revenues since the United States sanctioned Myanma Foreign Trade Bank. 97. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that governments that have heretofore been allies in efforts to isolate the junta are backing away from their previous commitments or deprioritizing support for the people of Myanmar. While the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Canada and Australia have all sanctioned the State Administration Council, none have sanctioned the State Security and Peace Commission, the junta’s new administrative body. This failure suggests that the sanctioning governments lack the vigilance and commitment necessary to ensure the effectiveness of their Myanmar sanctions’ regimes. 98. In July 2025, the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control made the surprising decision to remove four companies and four individuals from its Specially Designated Nationals list, lifting the US sanctions that were imposed against them. The Treasury Department had previously sanctioned these entities and individuals for their ties to the junta. All four companies had been linked to the Myanmar military’s procurement of weapons and supplies, including in the Special Rapporteur’s previous reports. In August, the Special Rapporteur wrote to the United States government to ask for the rationale behind this action. As of early October, he had not received a reply. In August, the junta reportedly signed contracts with two US lobbying firms to help influence United States policy toward Myanmar. VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations 99. The crisis in Myanmar remains invisible to most of the world, and the inattention and inaction of the international community has made the crisis significantly worse. 100. As conditions continue to deteriorate for millions of people in Myanmar, the military junta has escalated its use of sophisticated weapons of war to target civilians. Actions by some States have demonstrated the potential of international action to save untold numbers of lives. Unfortunately, many of these actions have stalled or been abandoned. 101. It is critical that the international community refocus and re-engage on the situation in Myanmar and make this invisible crisis visible. Governments should publicly and proactively stand with the people of Myanmar, hosting legitimate political representatives, pro-democracy activists and human rights defenders for public discussions on the human rights situation in Myanmar. Parliaments should convene public hearings on the crisis in Myanmar and pass measures to address it and its consequences. 102. The Special Rapporteur calls on States to take action to deny the junta the three things it requires to continue its attacks on and oppression of the people of Myanmar: money, weapons and legitimacy. To this end, he calls on States to: (a) Sanction the State Security and Peace Commission, which has replaced the State Administration Council as the junta’s principal organ of military control, and 5 Canadian sanctions of Myanma Foreign Trade Bank have been in place since 2012, and Australia sanctioned Myanma Foreign Trade Bank in 2024. 6 Canadian sanctions on Myanma Economic Bank have been in place since 2012. 14