ASEAN Regional Coalition to #StopDigitalDictatorship Since Feb. 1, 2021, the junta has taken control of have escaped detection by using images or coded platforms considered government and state media language.94 It is crucial to note that in the Burmese communications prior to its attempted coup, including context, Facebook plays a predominant role, as Facebook pages and Twitter accounts, in an attempt the figures show that people use both Facebook to dominate public discourse and spread pro-military and the Internet. Facebook thus seems to be used propaganda. While less than 30% of Myanmar’s as a search engine, underlining the importance of population uses social media, disinformation posts, stepping up vigilance on the platform.95 coordinated information warfare and propaganda launched by the junta have been overwhelmingly prevalent since the coup.89 For example, the authority wielded a rumour that discouraged people from protesting for 72 hours after the coup, in an effort to silence individuals.90 In 2021, about 200 military personnel were found to operate social media accounts to propagate the junta’s view and target dissenters online.91 Telegram is also one of the most used platforms for pro-junta accounts. Once made aware, Telegram blocked 13 pro-junta social media accounts but, since the platform allows for paid premium subscriptions, pro-military supporters and officials can simply create new accounts and continue their oppression and harassment of prodemocracy supporters.92 Although Facebook remains the most widely used platform in Myanmar, the coup has led to an increase in downloads from Twitter, Instagram and TikTok. These platforms are now used both by democracy supporters demanding their rights and by the military junta to pursue its propaganda.96 However, regulation of these platforms seems difficult, although TikTok has banned a number of accounts belonging to military personnel.97 Moreover, active pro-military propagandists, including Han Nyein Oo, Kyaw Swar and Thazin Oo, have transitioned to other platforms such as Viber and VKontakte (VK), according to a statement in late 2023. They remain committed to monitoring individuals online, contributing to the junta’s hunt for those it considers to be political opponents.98 Prior to the coup, lawsuits in the US and UK allege that Facebook facilitated the genocide of the Muslim-majority Rohingya in Myanmar due to the platform’s negligence. Facebook’s algorithms allegedly contributed to the amplification of Islamophobic and anti-Rohingya hate speech, and the platform failed to remove inflammatory posts. These allegations have led to compensation claims in excess of £150 billion.93 Despite some measures taken by Facebook to limit the dissemination of military content by removing some pages under military control and prohibiting paid advertisements by military-linked businesses, the situation appears to have only partially changed since the coup. The NGO Myanmar Witness found that the majority of the violent and misogynist publications it analysed remained online on Facebook and Twitter for at least six weeks, despite their failure to comply with community standards. Even after the Myanmar Witness reports, many TECH COMPANIES COMPLICIT OF DIGITAL DICTATORSHIP The military junta has increased its oversight of the internet by implementing measures such as mandating telecom providers to disable accessa and pressuring platforms to censor content critical of the coup. Two renowned international law experts presented a compelling legal memorandum to Telenor Group and M1 Group. Their advice was clear and urgent: halt the proposed sale of Telenor’s Myanmar subsidiary. The reason? To allow for comprehensive due diligence and ensure the transaction underwent rigorous scrutiny. publications remained active. Some content may 196 Dawn of Digital Dictatorship: Weaponizing the Law Against Online Speech in Southeast Asia