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The Xinjiang Project J24 appears to be Geedge's codename for the Xinjiang project. The Xinjiang project is unique from Geedge’s client governments because of the cross-pollination with Mesalab and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Also, Geedge’s sanctioned presence in Xinjiang is indicative of their close relationship with the government of China. Before launching the J24 project, a field test was conducted in Xinjiang with three major ISPs: China Unicom, China Mobile, and China Telecom. This test, which began in 2022 under the name Xinjiang Network Performance Monitoring (NPM), involved the installation of TSG hardware at the data centers of the pilot project ISPs. The system produced weekly reports, generated using Cyber Narrator, that included traffic data and information on the most popular applications, websites, and IP addresses by traffic volume. A key document, with a title that roughly translates to “Xinjiang Unicom IDC Project Cyber Narrator System Overview,” sheds light on this field test. Initially, the project focused on network performance optimization for the ISPs and content delivery network providers. It also aimed to detect undesirable activities such as cryptocurrency mining and telecom scams within the province, but it was not primarily focused on censorship. Instead, the project seemed designed for surveillance and system evaluation. System integration for this field test began in April 2022, and the project became fully functional that same month. By December 2023, all network links were taken offline. The system was officially decommissioned on March 29, 2024, after running for 23 months. The J24 project was initiated shortly afterward. Compared to the earlier project, J24 is far more extensive and is no longer operated through ISPs as the end-users. Instead, it follows a structure similar to other areas of Geedge's operations with foreign clients, with a “national center” (in Xinjiang Geedge refers to this as a central command center) overseeing distributed regional centers (referred to by Geedge as operator centers). Under J24, these operator centers are located in data facilities belonging to China Telecom, China Mobile, China Broadnet, and China Unicom. Like the so-called national centers, the central command center allows for remote management of the surveillance equipment deployed at the operator sites. According to one document, there were 17 operator centers across these ISPs' facilities. Testing Additional Features Through the J24 Project In the document titled CBNR-J24 Requirement Organization, Geedge outlines a list of features to incorporate into Cyber Narrator for their deployment in Xinjiang. Geedge Networks aim to support the summarization and analysis of user internet behavior, lifestyle patterns, and relationships as features in Cyber Narrator. They also want to add the ability to construct relationship graphs based on the people who a target communicates with and to group individuals according to the applications they use or the websites they visit.

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The Internet Coup A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes

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Topic

Digital Rights
Digital Surveillance
Internet Connectivity / Accessibility
Internet Restrictions

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INTER SECLAB

Date Published: Sep 9, 2025

Abstract: Over the past two decades, the Chinese government has been steadily refining their model of internet control using surveillance and censorship technologies domestically while promoting this approach to other nations under the banner of “digital sovereignty”. Through the export of these technologies, China is not only extending its global influence but also laying the foundation for a federated system of internet governance. In this system, Chinese companies provide the infrastructure and expertise for client governments to more easily monitor and control their own networks, while learning from these deployments and improving collective capacity for digital authoritarianism worldwide.

This research by InterSecLab uncovers evidence of the export of a suite of technologies resembling China’s Great Firewall by Geedge Networks, a private company linked to the academic entity ‘Massive and Effective Stream Analysis’ (Mesalab), a research laboratory at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Our team’s investigation identifies a pattern of commercialization of surveillance capabilities, with Geedge Networks offering a suite of products that enable comprehensive monitoring and control of internet users.

InterSecLab’s analysis reveals that Geedge Networks is contracted with governments in Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Myanmar, and one other unknown country to establish sophisticated systems of internet censorship and surveillance. Furthermore, our findings indicate that Geedge Networks is also involved in developing similar systems deployed within China, including in Xinjiang and other regions.

Based on analysis of a leak of more than 100,000 Geedge Networks documents that was shared with InterSecLab, this research sheds light on the features and capabilities of Geedge Networks’ systems, which include deep packet inspection, real-time monitoring of mobile subscribers, granular control over internet traffic, as well as censorship rules that can be tailored to each region. The leak also reveals information about Geedge Networks’ relationship with the academic entity, Mesalab, as well as their interactions with client governments. The implications for data sovereignty are significant, and our findings raise concerns about the commoditization of surveillance and information control technologies.

This research examines the recent development of Geedge Networks’ systems in various countries, including what is known about their deployment timelines. By analyzing the company’s internal documentation, InterSecLab was able to chronicle the expansion of commercially available national firewalls and speculate about the implications for the future of the global internet considering the spread of such systems.

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The Internet Coup A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes

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