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Contd. Myanmar and Geedge The planning document notes data centers for every ISP, state-owned or private, present in the country. The “big four” ISPs, MyTel, Ooredoo, MPT and ATOM, are listed as well as entries for smaller providers like Frontiir, Global Technology Group, Golden TMH Telecom, Stream Net, IM-Net, Myanmar Broadband Telecom, Myanmar Telecommunications Network Public Company Limited, Campana and China Unicom. Documents also contains reports for link tests for all the ISPs. These reports provide information on website connectivity tests conducted in different dates throughout 2024. The objective of the tests seems to be to evaluate the effectiveness of the censorship on each ISP’s network. ISP Denial of Geedge Hardware and a Focus on VPN Blocking In May 2025, Finance Uncovered and Myanmar Now reported that the ISP Frontiir, which received foreign investment from the governments of Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom, was operating Geedge technology capable of “tracking people online, blocking websites” and VPNs in their data center.66 A Frontiir spokesperson denied that it had ever “built, planned, or designed anything related to surveillance” on its network. The leaked documents, however, indicate that Geedge hardware is installed inside the buildings of all the ISPs in Myanmar including Frontiir. The documents provide details on these installations and how the ISP links are interconnected. The network planning document diagram below, shows how the Geedge system is integrated inside the Frontiir data center. It is crucial to note that there is no way for Geedge to install its hardware without the knowledge and collaboration from ISPs. With evidence from the leaked documents, we know that denials from ISPs like Frontiir, claiming that they are not aware of surveillance equipment deployed on their networks, are factually incorrect. Our team contacted Myanmar ISPs referred in this report. We received an answer from Investcom Holding, the parent company behind ATOM (formerly Telenor Myanmar). Investcom Holding stated in their letter that ATOM’s network does not design, direct &/or conduct mass, unlawful surveillance. They also said that as ATOM operates a telecommunications network it must comply with binding laws and regulations and that ATOM applies internal human-rights due-diligence procedures aligned with the UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs). The full content of the Investcom Holding can be found in the Annex.

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The Internet Coup A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes

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Topic

Digital Rights
Digital Surveillance
Internet Connectivity / Accessibility
Internet Restrictions

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INTER SECLAB

Date Published: Sep 9, 2025

Abstract: Over the past two decades, the Chinese government has been steadily refining their model of internet control using surveillance and censorship technologies domestically while promoting this approach to other nations under the banner of “digital sovereignty”. Through the export of these technologies, China is not only extending its global influence but also laying the foundation for a federated system of internet governance. In this system, Chinese companies provide the infrastructure and expertise for client governments to more easily monitor and control their own networks, while learning from these deployments and improving collective capacity for digital authoritarianism worldwide.

This research by InterSecLab uncovers evidence of the export of a suite of technologies resembling China’s Great Firewall by Geedge Networks, a private company linked to the academic entity ‘Massive and Effective Stream Analysis’ (Mesalab), a research laboratory at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Our team’s investigation identifies a pattern of commercialization of surveillance capabilities, with Geedge Networks offering a suite of products that enable comprehensive monitoring and control of internet users.

InterSecLab’s analysis reveals that Geedge Networks is contracted with governments in Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Myanmar, and one other unknown country to establish sophisticated systems of internet censorship and surveillance. Furthermore, our findings indicate that Geedge Networks is also involved in developing similar systems deployed within China, including in Xinjiang and other regions.

Based on analysis of a leak of more than 100,000 Geedge Networks documents that was shared with InterSecLab, this research sheds light on the features and capabilities of Geedge Networks’ systems, which include deep packet inspection, real-time monitoring of mobile subscribers, granular control over internet traffic, as well as censorship rules that can be tailored to each region. The leak also reveals information about Geedge Networks’ relationship with the academic entity, Mesalab, as well as their interactions with client governments. The implications for data sovereignty are significant, and our findings raise concerns about the commoditization of surveillance and information control technologies.

This research examines the recent development of Geedge Networks’ systems in various countries, including what is known about their deployment timelines. By analyzing the company’s internal documentation, InterSecLab was able to chronicle the expansion of commercially available national firewalls and speculate about the implications for the future of the global internet considering the spread of such systems.

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The Internet Coup A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes

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