48 Hate Speech Ignited: Understanding Hate Speech in Myanmar [the military] ha[s] to defend the national boundaries.”252 This narrative has framed the Tatmadaw as Myanmar’s savior, with their strength necessary to prevent further violence, and violence on their part justified by the need to keep the country safe and intact.253 CSOs reported feeling that those in the military buy into this narrative and sincerely believe that only they can “protect not only the boundaries, but also the [nation’s] values.”254 One interviewee noted that: [The military has] brainwashed many generations that they need to defend the coun- try . . . . They will defend the country by any means. They always say the Tatmadaw is your father, mother.255 According to another interviewee, the power of this narrative lies not only in its appeal, but also in its effects: That’s what the military government wanted—to divide the civilians as much as they can so they can rule the country as they like. They took advantage of the diversity within the country. The unity of civilians is the worst fear for the military . . . because the civilians together can change the government and leaders of the country.256 Indeed, this narrative has helped facilitate the military’s stature in Myanmar society and been central to justifying the use of nearly unchecked military might to “protect” the state and ensure its survival. By playing into myths of national security, even the NLD and prominent politicians sometimes have embraced this narrative when it has been helpful to the political agenda.257 Human rights defenders and journalists in Myanmar as traitors In Myanmar’s politically charged environment, critiquing those in power and challenging hate speech has been dangerous. Voices critical of hate speech – whether they are individuals, CSOs, or journalists – have often been portrayed as race traitors to the nation.258 For example, a monk who spoke to Reuters in 2018 described, “if you don’t write from the side of your own religion, they think of you as a traitor.”259 Perhaps the most prominent example of these dynamics is the conviction of Reuters journalists Ko Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, who were given seven-year sentences under the Official Secrets Act for reporting on the killing of 10 Rohingya men in the city of Inn Din in Rakhine State.260 Though they were eventually released on May 6, 2019, the journalists spent over 500 days in prison.261 Their in252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 002-R1-01, 2. Ibid; Beech, “The Face of Buddhist Terror.” FGD (January 2019 and December 2019). 002-R1-01, 3. 002-R4-04, 4. See, e.g., International Crisis Group, “Buddhist and State Power.” John Reed, “Hate speech, atrocities and fake news: the crisis of democracy in Myanmar,” FT Magazine, February 22, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/2003d54e-169a-11e8-9376-4a6390addb44. Tom Lasseter, “Dangerous News: How two young reporters shook Myanmar,” Reuters, August 8, 2018, https://www. reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-reporters-democracy/. Simon Lewis and Shoon Naing, “Two Reuters reporters freed in Myanmar after more than 500 days in jail,” Reuters, May 6, 2019. Ibid.