SHRINKING DEMOCRACY, GROWING VIOLENCE 36 Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) Regional overview in 2023 7 36 18 shutdowns shutdowns shutdowns Ukraine: 8* *6 of these imposed by Russia Azerbaijan: 5 6 8 4 countries countries countries 2021 2022 2023 13 shutdowns during conflict in 2023: 5 missile strikes targeting civilian infrastructure by the Russian military 4 deliberate disconnections in the Nagorno-Karabakh region Russia: 3 Turkmenistan: 2 61.1% of shutdowns in the region corresponded to documented grave human rights abuses 3 cyberattacks in Ukraine 1 conflict-related platform block in Azerbaijan (TikTok) The total number of shutdowns in the EECA region dropped by more than 50% from 2022 to 2023, due to the shifting situation on the battlefield during Russia’s continued illegal invasion and occupation of Ukraine, and a downturn in new cases in Central Asia after a spike in 2022.176 However, the region still saw 18 shutdowns, 13 of which were implemented during active conflict where military use of targeted missile strikes, cyberattacks, and deliberate disconnections led to spotty connectivity and a variety of shutdowns. Authorities in Russia and Turkmenistan combined repressive censorship and efforts to build isolated national intranets with multi-year platform blocks to assert control over the flow of information domestically. Overall, Russia’s outsized impact is impossible to ignore: in 2023, it alone implemented 50% of all shutdowns in the EECA region. Russia and Ukraine As Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine continued to draw condemnation domestically and internationally, Russian authorities also continued to wield shutdowns as part of their military strategy in Ukraine and as a tool to silence critics at home.177 In 2023, Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition recorded nine shutdowns perpetrated by Russian authorities in Russia and Ukraine. Russian authorities imposed six shutdowns in Ukraine in 2023, compared to 22 in 2022. While the total number of shutdowns decreased, the scale, scope, and impact were just as significant. In 2022, Russia repeatedly attacked and attempted to gain control 176 See The Washington Post (2023). How Russia learned from mistakes to slow Ukraine’s counteroffensive. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/08/russia-ukraine-defense-counteroffensive/ 177 See Consillium.europa.eu (2024). EU response to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/