SHRINKING DEMOCRACY, GROWING VIOLENCE 34 For people who are being pushed toward systems that depend on internet connectivity and access to mobile networks to function, the negative impact of internet shutdowns is only becoming more severe. In 2023, 59% (68) of the shutdowns in India exclusively targeted mobile networks — and where almost 96% of people with internet access depend on wireless services, disruption to mobile internet essentially equates to a full internet blackout.161 Rather than protecting communities, internet shutdowns in India are deepening the digital divide and undermining efforts toward equitable and inclusive digitization. Despite clear economic effects, disproportionate impacts on marginalized groups, and the shielding of atrocities, authorities continue to implement shutdowns at all levels across India during protests, exams, elections, and communal violence. East Asia China’s government is equipped with some of the most sophisticated censorship and surveillance infrastructure in the world.162 For many years, through the Great Firewall, authorities have restricted access to websites, search engines, social media platforms, games, and more, leaving behind a heavily censored and highly surveilled internet ecosystem. In 2023, the government further tightened the vise, causing a reported spike in VPN use inside the country as people attempted to regain access despite severe punishments for those caught using circumvention technologies.163 Due to the nature of China’s entirely state-controlled internet, which is splintered off from the rest of the world, remotely measuring internet traffic is nearly impossible and on-network investigations are very dangerous, making it extremely challenging to document distinct instances of network disruptions or throttling. In addition, while reports indicate shutdowns continue to happen with some frequency at a local level, the increasing totality of China's surveillance and censorship regime means that authorities are able to deploy both wide nets of censorship and highly targeted disruptions, even targeting home and mobile connections of individual activists, reducing the need for full-network shutdowns.164 Many of China’s restrictions on communications platforms that operate from outside the country have been in place for a decade or longer and are not currently reflected in the #KeepItOn database, which began in 2016. Our current data reflects China’s blocking of Signal and Grindr, both ongoing since 2021.165 In Taiwan, following repeated damage to undersea cables in February 2023, 14,000 residents of the Matsu Islands lost internet and phone service for at least two months.166 Taiwanese authorities suspect the cables were cut by a Chinese fishing vessel and a Chinese cargo ship, each independently severing the cable in separate incidents only six days apart.167 Experts indicated the levels of damage to the steelencased cables were “highly unusual.”168 According to Chunghwa, Taiwan’s largest telecoms provider, the cables have been cut 27 times in the past five years, which is disproportionate to other regions globally.169 While there is not sufficient evidence to definitively confirm the 2023 cable cut as an intentional attack — and we therefore have not counted the disruption as an intentional shutdown in the #KeepItOn STOP database — the tactics are consistent with China’s overall “gray-zone warfare” strategy against Taiwan.170 This disruption has further highlighted the immense vulnerability of internet infrastructure for Taiwan 161 See Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (2023). The Indian Telecom Services Performance Indicators: July–September, 2023. https://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/QPIR_09022024_0.pdf 162 Freedom House (2024). Freedom In The World 2024; China. https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024/ 163 VOA News (2024). China’s VPN Usage Nearly Doubles Amid Internet Censorship. https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-vpnusage-nearly-doubles-amid-internet-censorship/7488465.html/ 164 165 Freedom House (2021). Freedom On The Net 2021. https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-net/2021/ Supra note 138. 166 AP News (2023). Taiwan suspects Chinese ships cut islands' internet cables. https://apnews.com/article/matsu-taiwaninternet-cables-cut-china-65f10f5f73a346fa788436366d7a7c70/ 167 168 Ibid. Ibid. 169 Vice (2023). 'A Warning Sign': Chinese Ships Accused of Cutting Off Internet to a Taiwanese Island. https://www.vice.com/en/article/bvj8x3/taiwan-internet-cables-matsu-china/ 170 See, e.g., Reuters (2021). China's latest weapon against Taiwan: the sand dredger. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ TAIWAN-CHINA/SECURITY/jbyvrnzerve/