SHRINKING DEMOCRACY, GROWING VIOLENCE 12 II. Triggers for internet shutdowns in 2023 Triggers of internet shutdowns refer to incidents during which authorities are more likely to impose internet shutdowns. Governments intentionally disrupted internet access to coincide with important national events such as protests and political instability, military coups, elections, examinations, conflicts, and other key events with one aim — to restrict the flow of information and control the narrative. Shutdowns during conflicts Conflict was the leading trigger for internet shutdowns for the first time in 2023, with warring parties imposing 74 shutdowns in nine countries (Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, India, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Palestine, Sudan, and Ukraine). This far exceeds the 36 shutdowns in nine countries recorded in 2022.19 Even still, evidence suggests that both for prior years and in 2023, these cases are severely underreported given the challenges people are facing to document their experience while also fending for their lives.20 Authorities imposing internet shutdowns in active conflict zones have leveraged an increasingly diverse array of tactics, making prevention and circumvention challenging and introducing far- reaching consequences for impacted communities long after the fighting recedes. Both the Myanmar junta and the Israeli military have systematically paired the deployment of targeted internet shutdowns with air strikes and other military activity, often targeting civilian populations.21 Cutting off access to communications channels removes any hope for civilians under attack of accessing information about possible evacuation routes or connecting with loved ones to see if they survived.22 Similarly, Israeli and Russian forces have deliberately targeted civilian telecommunications infrastructure during active conflict as a collective punishment or retaliatory action in Palestine and Ukraine, respectively,23 while warring parties in both Sudan and Ukraine have gone head to head battling over physical control of telecommunications infrastructure.24 Beyond direct kinetic attacks, we’ve also seen perpetrators leveraging fuel embargos to cut off energy supply to telecommunications services and cyberattacks aimed at disrupting networks in areas held by opposing forces.25 Only underscoring the importance of staying connected during times of conflict, perpetrators of shutdowns in conflict zones have gotten more sophisticated at using circumvention tactics to keep themselves or bordering civilian populations online. The Israeli authorities developed a comprehensive strategy to maintain connectivity for settlements bordering Gaza, while keeping the occupied territory under siege in the dark.26 From Ukraine to Sudan and beyond, low-earth-orbit satellite internet systems have emerged as an increasingly vital — and increasingly politicized — mechanism for circumvention and determining who is allowed access 19 See supra note 1. Access Now (2023). 20 See, e.g., the section below on Myanmar for more information regarding the likelihood of underreporting. 21 See The Intercept (2023). Israel Warns Palestinians on Facebook - but Bombings Decimated Gaza Internet Access. https:// theintercept.com/2023/10/12/israel-gaza-internet-access/; EngageMedia (2024). Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly: November 2023-January 2024. https://engagemedia.org/2024/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2023-january-2024/ 22 See Access Now (2024). #KeepItOn in times of war: Sudan’s communication shutdown must be reversed urgently. https:// www.accessnow.org/press-release/keepiton-sudan-shutdown/ 23 See AlfaNet (@AlfaNetIT). Facebook post. 11:31 pm. October 7, 2023. https://www.facebook.com/AlfaNetIT/posts/ pfbid02GSsU8PdChNktczmp4RT1k3RZZdY8vN9YZXf4UUVx2F7CutcWKzu4TcuYggZ2e67sl/; Reuters (2023). Russian missiles pound Ukraine’s energy system, force power outages. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-strike-ukraineair-raid-sirens-wail-across-country-2023-02-10/; see also ICRC (n.d.). The Principle of Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule7 ; Médecins sans frontières (n.d.). The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law: Reprisals. https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/reprisals/ 24 See, e.g., Digital Rights Lab - Sudan (@DRLab_Sudan). X post. 1:28 pm. February 24, 2024. https://x.com/DRLab_Sudan/ status/1754134933772128326/; Cloudflare (2022). Tracking shifts in Internet connectivity in Kherson, Ukraine. https://blog. cloudflare.com/tracking-shifts-in-internet-connectivity-in-kherson-ukraine/ 25 See, e.g., Access Now (2023). Depleting fuel and infrastructure damage: Gaza's internet lifeline must be saved. https://www. accessnow.org/press-release/internet-lifeline-must-be-saved-in-gaza/; The Record (2023). Ukraine's largest telecom operator shut down after cyberattack. https://therecord.media/kyivstar-cyberattack-telecom-shutdown-ukraine/ 26 Israel Ministry of Communications (2023). Summary of the activities of the Ministry of Communications - ten days into the war. https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/17102023/