FREEDOM ON THE NET 2024 The Struggle for Trust Online Developing remedies that protect internet freedom I n more than half of the 41 FOTN countries that held or prepared for nationwide elections during the coverage period, governments took steps aimed at making the information space more reliable. Common interventions included engaging with technology companies to boost authoritative information from election commissions or to address false and misleading information; supporting factchecking initiatives led by local media and civil society; and setting rules for how political campaigns can use generative AI. The measures often varied within a given country, with regulatory bodies taking different—and at times conflicting— approaches based on their mandate, legal authority, structural independence, and political incentives. To determine whether these efforts strengthened or undermined internet freedom, Freedom House assessed them based on four criteria: transparency in their decisionmaking and related processes, meaningful engagement with local civil society, independent implementation and democratic oversight, and adherence to international human rights standards. These features, when present, helped guard against government overreach and company malfeasance, fostered trust and legitimacy with the public, allowed for open debate about how to address false and misleading content, and facilitated the incorporation of diverse expertise that leads to more informed and effective actions. The most promising approaches were found in South Africa, the European Union (EU), and Taiwan, whose interventions largely met all four criteria. The efforts of Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court demonstrated the complexity of upholding internet freedom while countering disinformation campaigns. 14 @freedomonthenet A myriad set of factors limited assessment of whether the actions explored in this report were effective at fostering a high-quality, diverse, and trustworthy information environment. For one, the utility of each remedy depended on each setting’s unique context, such as a country’s political dynamics or legal framework. The same fact-checking initiative that proves effective in an established democracy may flounder in an environment where the state exercises control over online media. Several policies were simply too new to assess, as countering false and misleading information is generally a long-term endeavor. The voluntary or nontransparent nature of many interventions also made enforcement difficult to track. Finally, research gaps, created in part by government pressure that has chilled the work of fact-checkers and by company decisions to roll back access to platform data, hamper understanding of how false, misleading, and incendiary content spreads and the extent to which interventions are addressing the problem. When state regulators overstep In the periods surrounding major elections, many governments attempted to address false, misleading, or incendiary content by enforcing content-removal rules among technology companies. The most problematic efforts lacked transparency and robust oversight, failed to involve civil society, and unduly restricted free expression and access to information. The risks of overreach were most profound in settings where some forms of protected online speech were already criminalized, the rule of law was weak, and regulatory bodies lacked independence. Ahead of Indonesia’s February 2024 elections, authorities launched efforts to address purportedly illegal content online, but the initiative was marred by opacity that raised concerns about abuse. The elections oversight agency Bawaslu, the communications regulator Kominfo, and the national police established a joint election desk to identify and request the removal of “illegal” content by platforms, in part reportedly due to frustrations that tech companies had failed to adequately #FreedomOnTheNet