Third World Quarterly 135 a major global threat. The process of religious radicalisation, whereby individuals adopt attitudes and behaviours favouring the use of violence to achieve religious objectives, has come into focus within an expanding policy and academic discourse on how to counter violent extremism. The radical Buddhist nationalism which has (re)emerged in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, is an important reminder that any religion – including Buddhism known for its principles of non-violence – can be instrumentalised to justify violence. Conflicts in these two countries have been framed as ‘religious’ when radical Buddhist groups mobilise around the sense that Buddhism is under threat and in need of protection. Religion is also closely tied to national identity, and the boundary-maintenance between those who belong to the nation – and thereby to the country – and those who do not. The global upsurge of religious conflicts has triggered a growth in the study and practice of religious peacebuilding. ‘[T]he use of a religious rationale to justify a conflict creates opportunities for spiritually motivated peacemakers’, Johnston and Sampson (1994, 332) note. Much of the religious peacebuilding literature points to this ambivalent role of religion: religion is a source not only of intolerance, human rights violations, and extremist violence, but also of nonviolent conflict transformation, the defense of human rights, integrity in government, and reconciliation and stability in divided societies. (Appleby 2001, 821) A growing number of religious actors have been involved in peacebuilding efforts over the past few decades (Kadayifci-Orellana 2009, 276–77; Omer 2012, 2) and interfaith initiatives have mushroomed. Peacebuilding can draw on religious resources. For instance, it can make use of the authority of religious leaders, the mobilising and legitimising power of holy texts, myths and religious discourse, and the networks and economic assets of religious institutions (see Harpviken and Roislien 2008; Appleby 2008). In addition to the insights from the literature on religion, conflict and peace, this article uses analytical tools from social movement theory. Social movements are usually understood as sustained collective action carried out with the objective of instigating or resisting social change. A movement can consist of numerous, sometimes uncoordinated, organisations and initiatives mobilising towards the same aim (see Snow et al. 2004). The emergence, strategies and outcomes of social movements have traditionally been analysed primarily in relation to the state towards which they make claims and which restricts or provides opportunities for their mobilisation. Some social movements, however, are greatly influenced by competing movements. A movement may emerge in response to another social movement, and focus not primarily on claims-making towards the state, but on inhibiting the mobilisation of the contesting movement (Dillard 2013, 781). The rise of a countermovement is often triggered by the success of another movement, real or perceived threats to the interests of a group, and opportunities provided by political allies (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, 1635). Some social movement researchers have conceived of countermovements as a conservative response to an original, progressive social movement that challenges the status quo. In practice, however, it may be difficult to distinguish between initiating and responding movements and to draw clear lines between progressive and reactionary mobilisation. Instead, Meyer and Staggenborg (1996, 1632) suggest that we talk about ‘opposing movements’ engaged in what Zald and Useem (1987, 247) has called a ‘loosely coupled tango of mobilization and demobilization’. Paying attention to the interaction between opposing movements enables important insights that are not available if we study a single movement. For instance, it reveals how the timing, venues