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Myanmar ARTICLE 19 have multiple accounts on different platforms and can easily jump platforms or change accounts on the same platform, taking their followers with them.216 Telegram links are posted on TikTok and Facebook accounts to maximise their reach, for example, allowing problematic content to jump platforms.217 Users have also taken to posting subtler content which is harder for platforms to detect. 218 Platforms need to make sustained investments in content moderation in response, including using moderators who have knowledge of the local context. Case study: Telenor in Myanmar Telenor is a telecommunications company majority-owned by the Norwegian state. In 2013, it won a competitive bid for one of 2 nationwide telecommunication licences offered by the Government of Myanmar.219 Its wholly owned subsidiary, Telenor Myanmar, introduced a mobile phone network across the country in 2014. By 2020, Telenor Myanmar had over 18 million mobile subscriptions, covering 92% of the population.220 It was a favoured choice of activists and human rights defenders because it was perceived as being safer and more rights-protective than the military-owned alternatives or Qatar’s Ooredoo. After the coup, Telenor and other telecommunications operators started to receive daily notices to blacklist certain websites and VPNs, and they also came under pressure to share user information with the military.221 This put Telenor in a difficult human rights position, although the pre-coup government had also asked Telenor to cooperate in internet shutdowns in the states of Rakhine and Chin, so this was not an entirely unprecedented problem. Before the coup, Telenor had said it was in ‘continuous dialogue’ with authorities to restore access, while following the coup such dialogue was likely implausible.222 In any case, Telenor decided it could no longer sustain operations in the country. Its statements in relation to the decision cited ‘our own values on human rights and responsible business’ and conflicts between Myanmar and European laws, as well as the safety of its employees.223 In July 2021, it announced the sale of its Myanmar subsidiary to M1 Group, a Lebanese firm. The military initially blocked the sale, likely because it wanted to ensure that a local military-affiliated company was involved. The sale was eventually finalised in March 2021, after the Myanmar military approved an arrangement by which M1 granted a majority stake to Shwe Byain Phyu, a Myanmar entity with military ties. 224 ____________________________________________ 216 Interview with Dhevy Sivaprakasam, Access Now. Mi-Kun, In Myanmar. 218 International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s Military. 219 Mizzima, Telenor Promises State-of-the-Art Network, BNI, 28 June 2013. 220 Telenor, Building a Network, Connecting a Nation. 221 Mi-Kun, In Post-Coup Myanmar, Telco Operators Act as the Military’s Eyes and Ears, EngageMedia, 31 July 2023. 222 Telenor, Continued Network Restrictions in Myanmar from 1 August 2020 (Updated 31 December 2020. 223 Telenor, Sale of Telenor Myanmar Approved by Myanmar Authorities, 18 March 2022. 224 P. McPherson and F. Potkin, Myanmar Firm Poised to Control Telenor Unit after Military Backs Bid, Reuters, 11 February 2022. 217 50

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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Information Operation
Internet Restrictions

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Article 19

Date Published: Oct 5, 2024

Abstract: In this report, ARTICLE 19 reviews the human rights context and responsibilities of tech companies operating in 3 authoritarian countries in Asia, namely China, Myanmar, and Vietnam. It focuses on the rights to freedom of expression and privacy, and the manner in which authoritarian states directly or indirectly expect companies to assist them in censoring content, promoting propaganda, accessing user data, and engaging in surveillance. While these are undoubtedly highly challenging contexts, companies have not sufficiently prioritised protecting human rights in their policies and actions. States are the primary duty bearers under international human rights law, but companies also have human rights responsibilities, as outlined in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Even if domestic law or circumstances make it impossible for companies to fully meet their human rights responsibilities, they should take action so as to respect human rights standards to the greatest extent possible. Tech companies should not merely reference local law as an excuse for collaborating in rights violations. They should take steps such as those detailed in this report, like adopting appropriate policies, asking governments to justify content removal requests clearly and specifically, and reporting transparently on their compliance with government demands. For each country, we survey the country context and provide an overview of legal obligations which companies operate under that are problematic from the perspective of international human rights law and that may, as a result, put pressure on companies to become complicit in violations of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy. We then explore how Western tech companies operating in these countries, many of which have explicitly stated their commitment to respecting freedom of expression and privacy, have responded to these legal obligations and to other government expectations that they will cooperate in violations of these rights.

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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