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Myanmar ARTICLE 19 had since ‘aggressively banned’ numerous accounts.201 It also took steps such as issuing new guidance to its moderators and expanding partnerships with Burmese civil society. 202 However, TikTok has also faced ongoing challenges regarding content moderation in Myanmar, partly because the military’s behaviour on the platform is different from its behaviour on other platforms, with soldiers less likely to wear uniforms and show weapons, demonstrating the need for the company to scale its content moderation efforts.203 X (formerly Twitter) has also become more popular in Myanmar since the coup and, although it appears more popular with activists than the military, there have been issues with the company failing to take action against military-affiliated misinformation. 204 Since Elon Musk’s takeover of the platform in 2022, some Myanmar activists who use X have voiced concerns about a decline in content moderation enabling the proliferation of military accounts and about Musk’s threat to require user authentication compromising the anonymity and security of at-risk activists.205 The extent to which these fears are justified depends somewhat on future policy choices at X, although a decline in content moderation at X has been observed globally. Google has also taken some actions to remove military content, taking down a military propaganda blog from its Blogger platform and reviewing advertisements run by Mytel, in both cases after activists campaigned for them to remove the content. 206 Both the Google and the Apple app stores also removed an app developed by the Myanmar military for its military-controlled broadcaster in 2022, a day after its launch, after campaigners called for its removal.207 Google and Apple have, however, failed to remove other military-associated apps, as called for by advocates, such as the military’s OKPar, which is supposed to be a Facebook alternative.208 Many major tech companies have, therefore, taken at least some action against military content on their platforms. A notable exception is Telegram, where the military has found a safe haven as other platforms have become more inaccessible. UN experts have warned that Telegram has become a ‘hotbed’ of pro-military activity, including violent and ____________________________________________ 201 K. Lyons, TikTok Banning Some Accounts in Myanmar, 20 March 2021. International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s Military, p. 22. 203 International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s Military. 204 E. Hale, From China to Thailand, Dissidents Fear Musk’s Twitter Reign, Al-Jazeera, 7 November 2022. 205 Hale, From China to Thailand; A. Deck, E. Fishbein, and G. Glatsky, Where Anonymity on Twitter Is a Matter of Life or Death, Rest of World, 6 May 2022. 206 J. Elder, Google Has Pulled Down a Propaganda Blog Backing the Military Coup in Myanmar after Outcry by Online Activists, Business Insider, 20 February 2021; F. Potkin, Google and Viber Review Adverts for Myanmar Military Backed-Telecoms Firm, Reuters, 10 March 2021. 207 Justice for Myanmar, US Tech Firms Enabling Myanmar Junta Propaganda, 5 May 2022; The Irrawaddy, Myanmar Junta Propaganda App Ditched by Apple and Google, 7 May 2022. 208 Access Now, Meta and Google Must Use Their Powers to Stop Myanmar’s Alternative Propaganda Machine, 21 September 2021 (OKPar was also still available on both app stores at the time of writing). 202 48

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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Information Operation
Internet Restrictions

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Article 19

Date Published: Oct 5, 2024

Abstract: In this report, ARTICLE 19 reviews the human rights context and responsibilities of tech companies operating in 3 authoritarian countries in Asia, namely China, Myanmar, and Vietnam. It focuses on the rights to freedom of expression and privacy, and the manner in which authoritarian states directly or indirectly expect companies to assist them in censoring content, promoting propaganda, accessing user data, and engaging in surveillance. While these are undoubtedly highly challenging contexts, companies have not sufficiently prioritised protecting human rights in their policies and actions. States are the primary duty bearers under international human rights law, but companies also have human rights responsibilities, as outlined in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Even if domestic law or circumstances make it impossible for companies to fully meet their human rights responsibilities, they should take action so as to respect human rights standards to the greatest extent possible. Tech companies should not merely reference local law as an excuse for collaborating in rights violations. They should take steps such as those detailed in this report, like adopting appropriate policies, asking governments to justify content removal requests clearly and specifically, and reporting transparently on their compliance with government demands. For each country, we survey the country context and provide an overview of legal obligations which companies operate under that are problematic from the perspective of international human rights law and that may, as a result, put pressure on companies to become complicit in violations of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy. We then explore how Western tech companies operating in these countries, many of which have explicitly stated their commitment to respecting freedom of expression and privacy, have responded to these legal obligations and to other government expectations that they will cooperate in violations of these rights.

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