Myanmar ARTICLE 19 of Rakhine and Chin, affecting over a million people.169 Since the coup, internet shutdowns have become more common in other parts of the country as well. Access Now reports that in 2021 alone, the internet was disconnected 15 times in Myanmar, with the longest nationwide disruption lasting nearly 2.5 months.170 These shutdowns have had devastating impacts, such as inhibiting essential supplies from reaching villages when drivers could not determine safe travel routes. 171 The military also appears to be using the shutdowns strategically, imposing disruptions prior to and during attacks on villages so as to avoid information about killings, torture, ill treatment, arrests, and arson – all of which are widespread – from being documented and shared.172 The military reliance on internet shutdowns may be partly a result of its limited technical capacity to block or intercept internet communications.173 However, the military has also issued ‘blacklists’ to companies listing websites to be blocked, including major platforms like Facebook. It is apparently attempting to convert this into a ‘whitelist’ approach according to which only approved websites would be allowed.174 These approaches may be replacing broader shutdowns in light of the military’s lack of technical capacity to fully implement a controlled system similar to that of China or even Vietnam. Pro-military media accounts have also engaged in online harassment and doxxing of activists and other people opposed to the military, sometimes accompanied by calls for violence or even the offering of rewards for their assassination. There is some evidence that these campaigns have been coordinated by or directly connected to military actors.175 This context is very dangerous for journalists, activists, supporters of the political opposition, and indeed anyone expressing dissent. Military access to personal communications data can therefore be a life-or-death matter, as can platform policies regarding what posts are allowed. Legal obligations on tech companies Even before the coup, aspects of Myanmar’s legal framework failed to protect freedom of expression and privacy, although Myanmar does not have such wide-ranging intermediary liability rules as China or Vietnam. The military’s ability to enact laws is questionable under Myanmar’s own constitution, given the fundamental illegitimacy of the military regime, but ____________________________________________ Human Rights Watch, Myanmar: End World’s Longest Internet Shutdown, 19 June 2020. Access Now, The Return of Digital Authoritarianism: Internet Shutdowns in 2021, 2022. 171 ARTICLE 19, Myanmar: Internet Shutdowns Shrouding Torchings and Killings, 23 June 2022. 172 Access Now, Weapons of Control, Shields of Impunity, 2023. 173 International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s Military. 174 Frontier Myanmar, Whitelisted Internet Takes Myanmar Back to a ‘Dark Age’, 30 June 2021; International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s Military. 175 A. Nachemson, ‘Watermelon Suppression’: Doxing Campaign Targets Pro-Democracy Soldiers and Police, Frontier Myanmar, 14 March 2022; OHCHR, Myanmar: Social Media Companies Must Stand Up to Junta’s Online Terror Campaign, Say UN Experts, 13 March 2023. 169 170 42