A3: ချိတဆ ် က်မ,Yင 4 ့် ဆက်သယ ွ မ ် ,ကိF ကန်သ F ျားအား ့ တ်ရန် ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များြဖင့် အစိးF ရသည် အင်တာနက် အေြခခံအေဆာက်အအံမ ၀ မ4တ ် နည်းပညာပိFငး် ဆိင F ရ ် ာ သိမဟF F ့ တ ် ဥပေဒနည်းများြဖင့် ထိန်းချMပ် မ,ကိF ကျင့သ ် းFံ ပါသလား။ (၀-၆ မ4တ)် A3: Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? (0–6 points) 0 The military repeatedly shut down telecommunications services since seizing direct power. In the early hours of February 1, 2021, armed soldiers forcefully entered telecommunications providers’ offices and demanded a national internet shutdown.35 Since then, the military has repeatedly restricted connectivity by ordering internet shutdowns, slowdowns, and blocks while threatening service providers to ensure their compliance.36 military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) according to Telenor disclosures.44 The military began loosening national connectivity restrictions in late April 2021. Mobile services were repeatedly restricted at the local level during the coverage period. Cuts were reported in Yangon, Mandalay, Chin State, Kachin State, Karen State, Magway Region, and Tanintharyi Region, affecting millions of users.37 Sagaing Region has faced particularly long disruptions, with an indefinite service cut beginning in March 2022.38 Connectivity is curtailed in areas where antigovernment forces are particularly active, and online cuts coincide with severe offline crackdowns.39 The military was influential in the precoup civilian government's decisions to restrict connectivity. In June 2019, the NLD government imposed a mobile shutdown affecting 1.4 million people in Rakhine and Chin States, in an attempt to conceal atrocities committed against the Rohingya ethnic group.45 Connectivity was restricted at the military’s behest46 in order to “maintain stability and law and order,”47 with restoration only coming after the “security situation” improved.48 Access was briefly restored in these areas in February 2021.49 As the February 2021 coup began, the military ordered day-long national internet shutdowns timed to undermine anticoup protests.40 Internet restrictions were imposed after the coup took place. A digital curfew was enforced between February 15 and April 28: the military ordered access restricted overnight and irregular shutdowns and slowdowns during the day.41 On March 15, the military shut down all mobile connections on March 15, public Wi-Fi connections were shuttered on March 18 and wireless broadband service was restricted on April 1.42 Rare fixed-line broadband services (see A1) were the only way to access the internet for months.43 The MoTC directed the initial internet shutdowns, apparently under orders from the The MoTC has significant powers to disrupt connectivity without oversight or safeguards, as it controls much of the telecommunications infrastructure via the state-owned company Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). Private-sector providers were gradually diversifying ownership of mobile infrastructure and the internet backbone prior to the coup. Myanmar has three underwater and four overland internet gateways,50 and more were expected, including new satellite connections,51 because of a projected 70 percent growth in bandwidth.52 However, this diversification may not materialize as the military seeks to strengthen its grip over Myanmar’s internet infrastructure (see A4).53 In addition to the imposition of wide-ranging shutdowns, the military also instructed service providers to implement extensive restrictions on specific targets, blocking access to websites, applications, and social networks (see B1). ် ပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိင 4 င ် ံ Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတလ