120 Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, “Facebook is still censoring groups fighting the military coup in Myanmar,” Rest of World, May 14, 2021, https://restofworld.org/2021/facebook-is-still-censoring-groups-fighting-the-military-coup-in-myanmar/ 121 https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/official-secrets-act/ 122 “Directives from authorities in Myanmar – February-August 2021,” Telenor Group, September 15, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20220614072628/https://www.telenor.com/sustainability/responsible-business/humanrights/mitigate/human-rights-in-myanmar/directives-from-authorities-in-myanmar-february-2021/ 123 “Directives from authorities in Myanmar – February-August 2021,” Telenor Group, last updated July 28, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20220614072628/https://www.telenor.com/sustainability/responsible-business/humanrights/mitigate/human-rights-in-myanmar/directives-from-authorities-in-myanmar-february-2021/ 124 “Telecommunications Law – Law. No. 31/2013,” Free Expression Myanmar, October 8, 2013, http://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/telecommunications-law-en.pdf. 125 “The MoTC cites legal basis in Myanmar’s Telecommunication Law, and references circulation of fake news, stability of the nation and interest of the public as basis for the order,” from: “Data network restored in Myanmar,” Telenor Group, February 6, 2021, https://www.telenor.com/media/press-release/myanmar-authorities-orders-nationwide-shutdown-of-the-data-network; see also “Myanmar citizens oppose military takeover on social media,” Nikkei Asia, February 4, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/MyanmarCrisis/Myanmar-citizens-oppose-military-takeover-on-social-media; Kin Yi Yi Zaw, “Myanmar junta cuts off internet access ‘indefinitely’ to resistance stronghold of Sagaing,” Myanmar Now, March 4, 2022, https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-junta-cuts-offinternet-access-indefinitely-to-resistance-stronghold-of-sagaing 126 “Military’s cyber security bill worse than their previous draft,” Free Expression Myanmar, January 27, 2022, https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/militarys-cyber-security-bill-worse-than-their-previous-draft/; “GNI Calls for Withdrawal of Draft Cybersecurity Law in Myanmar,“ Global Network Initiative, January 31, 2022, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/cybersecurity-law-mm2022/. 127 Monika Bickert, “Publishing Our Internal Enforcement Guidelines and Expanding Our Appeals Process,” Facebook Newsroom, April 24, 2018, https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/comprehensive-community-standards/. 128 Discussions at the Myanmar Digital Rights Forum in Yangon on January 19, 2019. 129 “Community Standards Enforcement Report,” Facebook Transparency Center, https://transparency.fb.com/data/communitystandards-enforcement/ 130 “Violent and Graphic Content,” Facebook Transparency Center, https://transparency.fb.com/data/community-standardsenforcement/graphic-violence/facebook/ 131 “Oversight Board overturns Facebook decision: Case 2021-007-FB-UA,” Oversight Board, August 2021, https://oversightboard.com/news/342799874210662-oversight-board-overturns-facebook-decision-case-2021-007-fb-ua/; See a civil society submission to the Oversight Board on Facebook’s over-moderation here: “Oversight Board overrules Facebook deletion of Myanmar “hate speech” post,” Free Expression Myanmar, August 17, 2021, https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/oversight-boardoverrules-facebook-deletion-of-myanmar-hate-speech-post/ 132 Discussions about the effectiveness of Facebook’s content moderation, Myanmar Digital Rights Forum, January 19, 2019.; Kyaw Ye Lynn and Su Myat Mon, “On social media, cleaning up isn’t easy,” Frontier, December 28, 2018, https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/onsocial-media-cleaning-up-isnt-easy. 133 For example, some pro-Rohingya activists believe that content removal trends demonstrate prejudices among content reviewers against Rohingya. 134 Civil society has repeatedly stated that Facebook’s lack of transparency is a substantive concern, see “RSF calls for more Facebook transparency on Myanmar,” Reporters Without Borders, August 31, 2018, https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-calls-more-facebook-transparencymyanmar; Russel Brandom, “Activists from Myanmar and beyond call for Facebook to fix moderation,” The Verge, May 18, 2018, https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/18/17369570/facebook-coalition-myanmar-syria-sri-lanka-moderation-transparency-audit; Rebecca MacKinnon, “Facebook is part of an industry-wide problem: lack of transparency about policies affecting users’ online rights,” Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, [n.d.], https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/blog/facebook-is-part-of-an-industry-wide-problemlack-of-transparency-about-policies-affecting-users-online-rights/; Timothy McLaughlin, “How Facebook’s Rise Fueled Chaos and Confusion in Myanmar,” Wired, June 7, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/how-facebooks-rise-fueled-chaos-and-confusion-inmyanmar/; Dunstan Allison-Hope, “Our Human Rights Impact Assessment of Facebook in Myanmar,” Business for Social Responsibility, November 5, 2018, https://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/blog-view/facebook-in-myanmar-human-rights-impactassessment; Paul Mozur, “Groups in Myanmar Fire Back at Zuckerberg,” The New York Times, April 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/technology/zuckerberg-facebook-myanmar.html. 135 "Myanmar coup: YouTube removes channels run by army amid violence," BBC News, March 5, 2021, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-56282401 136 Discussions with digital rights defenders, March 16, 2022. See also: https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2022/an-open-letter-toyoutubes-ceo-from-the-worlds-fact-checkers/ 137 "'I will shoot whoever I see': Myanmar soldiers use TikTok to threaten protesters," Reuters, March 4, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-tiktok/i-will-shoot-whoever-i-see-myanmar-soldiers-use-tiktok-to-threaten-protestersidUSKBN2AW17X 138 "TikTok is repeating Facebook’s mistakes in Myanmar," Rest of World, March 18, 2021, https://restofworld.org/2021/tiktok-isrepeating-facebooks-mistakes-in-myanmar/ 139 "Myanmar Coup: Soldiers Flood TikTok With Calls to Violence," Vice World News, March 3, 2021, https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgq34b/myanmar-coup-soldiers-flood-tiktok-with-calls-to-violence 140 “TikTok Transparency Centre,” https://www.tiktok.com/transparency/en 141 Andrew Nachemson, “Channelling hate and disinformation: Myanmar’s bad actors move to Telegram,” Frontier Myanmar, September 15, 2021, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/channelling-hate-and-disinformation-myanmars-bad-actors-move-to-telegram/ 142 At least one social media platform had employees and consultants operating from within Myanmar when the coup began. 143 Two consultants were detained while trying to leave the country via the airport. The military reportedly suspected that the two were still Facebook employees, after they previously supported Facebook in interacting with Myanmar’s Directorate of Investment and Company Administration: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/22/two-australians-detained-by-myanmar-junta-while-trying-toleave-country 144 Discussions with digital rights defenders, March 16, 2022. 145 Personal monitoring of Facebook accounts since the coup, 23 March 2021. 146 Personal communications with human rights defenders working on digital rights, Yangon, May 2018. 147 Discussions with digital rights defenders, March 16, 2022. 148 “Myanmar’s media freedom at risk,” Free Expression Myanmar, May 2018, http://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/myanmars-media-freedom-at-risk.pdf; Hanna Ellis-Petersen, “Censorship and silence: south-east Asia suffers under press crackdown,” The Guardian, February 25, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/feb/25/censorship-and-silencesouth-east-asia-suffers-under-press-crackdown. ် ပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိင 4 င ် ံ Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတလ