networks (VPNs) were indiscriminate and led to significant collateral damage,103 including the disruption of content delivery networks like Google and Amazon services.104 Blocks disrupted banking, transportation, and—during the peak of the COVID- 19 pandemic—education and health care. Some businesses and banks raised concerns about their ability to operate.105 The blocks also undermined networks outside the country.106 B2: အစိးF ရ သိမဟF F ့ တ ် အစိးF ရမဟFတေ ် သာ အဖွဲU/ ပFဂိpMလ်များသည် ဥပေဒ၊ အFပ်ချMပ် ေရး သိမဟF F ့ တ ် အြခားနည်းလမ်းများ အသံးF ြပM၍ ၁ မ4တ ် ထFတေ ် ဝသNများ၊ အင်တာနက်ေပ:တွင ် အေDကာင်းအရာများ ေဝမmYိင F ရ ် န်ေနရာေပးသN (content host)များ၊ သိမဟF F ့ တ် ဒီဂျစ်တယ်ပလက်ေဖာင်းများအား အေDကာင်းအရာများကိF ဖျက်ပစ်ေပးရန် အတင်းအကျပ် ြပMလFပ်ပါသလား။ (၀-၄ မ4တ)် B2: Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content? (0–4 points) Pressure to remove content continued to originate from state and nonstate actors within Myanmar during the coverage period, as well as from outside the country. Most independent media outlets have closed, hid, or gone into exile in response to the military’s pressure, including its demands to cease critical coverage.107 Few if any independent publishers remain within military-controlled areas of Myanmar, and those that remain, such as the previously independent outlet Eleven Media, avoid content that criticizes the military.108 The military began pressuring publishers to delete content soon after staging its coup in February 2021. The military demanded that media outlets cease critical coverage of their actions, delete any words translating to “regime” and “junta”, and refrain from “biased” coverage (see B5).109 By March, Myanmar’s five daily newspapers had closed down, terminating their online and offline publishing.110 One of the largest outlets, 7DayDaily, deleted its entire website in response to the deteriorating situation.111 The military continued to threaten any publisher saying “coup”112 or “Rohingya” during the coverage period.113 The military has forced users to delete content, including while in custody.114 Under the draft Cyber Security Law proposed in January 2022, authorities 1 can force hosts and platforms to comply with its orders, blocking and holding them criminally liable if they refuse (see C2). Before the coup, the NLD government regularly called for content hosts and platforms to address intolerance, misinformation, and incitement,115 even though that government had failed in addressing those problems and NLD officials were alleged to have engaged in such behavior.116 The NLD government’s proposed Cyber Security Law was designed to make platforms criminally liable for a variety of ill-defined prohibited content.117 Pressure from civil society, media, and foreign governments had a significant effect upon Facebook to invest in and increase content moderation beginning in 2018, in response to atrocities committed against the Rohingya.118During the current coverage period, digital platforms faced continued pressure to introduce, increase, and improve content moderation in order to address military propaganda, disinformation, and threats.119 The increase in content moderation efforts by companies like Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok have also led to the removal of significant amounts of content, including content produced by antigovernment groups (see B3).120 ် ပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိင 4 င ် ံ Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတလ