Case 1:20-mc-00036-JEB-DAR Document 10 Filed 08/18/20 Page 15 of 29 intended to protect “a class of persons who are a part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”17 Accordingly, based on the plain meaning of the SCA, the statutory history of the SCA, and the contemplated scope of the Fourth Amendment, the SCA’s protections do not apply to the Myanmar government, its officials, and its agents, and it imposes no valid impediment to the issuance of the subpoena requested by The Gambia. b. The Myanmar government, its officials, and its agents are not “users” because they are not “duly authorized” by Facebook to use its service to coordinate and conspire to commit genocide. The SCA also does not apply for an entirely separate reason: It limits the term “users” to those who are “duly authorized” by the provider to engage in a particular use of the electronic communications service. But the Myanmar government, its officials, and its agents have not done so according to Facebook itself – which is why their accounts were removed – meaning that they are not “duly authorized” “users” under the plain language of the SCA. The SCA protects the privacy rights of a “user” of an “electronic communication service” (“ECS”). A “user” is defined as “any person or entity who (A) uses an electronic communication service; and (B) is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage in such use.”18 An ECS, which Facebook claims it is, is defined as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”19 The statute does not define “authorized.” However, in Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004), applying the common law doctrine of trespass, the Ninth Circuit interpreted 17 Id. at 265 (citing United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904)). 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (13) (2020) (emphasis added). 19 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (15) (2020) (emphasis added). 18 9