Myanmar: Analysis of the Organisation Registration Law Registration bodies should be independent, neutral and transparent. 52 States should not permit “excessive government control and discretion over the registration process”. 53 In order to ensure the impartiality of such bodies, their members should be appointed in a manner that is transparent and is insulated from political control.54 The registration bodies should include independent representatives of civil society and civil society should be consulted as part of the process of creating such bodies.55 A case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights illustrates these principles. The Nigerian Bar Association was regulated by a Body of Benchers consisting of 128 members. All except 31 of the 128 members were government nominees. The Commission found that because the Body of Benchers was “dominated by representatives of the government” and had “wide discretionary powers”, Nigeria had violated the right to freedom of association.56 In Myanmar, the registration boards are not only given significant discretion and dominated by government representatives, but are also subject to substantial military influence. Military influence compromises the independence of registration boards and of civil society. 57 Military involvement also introduces concerns about an overly securitised regulation of civic space, with an abusive reliance on alleged terrorist or security threats to deny registration or otherwise limit the activities of NGOs.58 Beyond concerns about military influence on the registration boards, at all levels, the registration boards do not reflect international standards on the impartiality and transparency of registration bodies. The elimination of NGO representatives and a wider range of government representatives from NGO registration boards severely undercuts their neutrality. In addition, the primary rules regarding the composition of registration boards should not be left to subordinate regulation or the discretion of the appointing body, but be located in the primary legislation. The former is not transparent and grants excessive powers to the government to control the appointment process. 52 OSCE and Venice Commission, note 33, para. 33; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, note 33, para. 16; and Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa, note 14, paras. 21-22. 53 2009 Report of the Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders, note 34, para. 70. 54 Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa, note 14, para. 21. 55 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders, 10 August 2012, para. 45, undocs.org/A/67/292; and 2009 Report of the Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders, note 34, para. 116. 56 Civil Liberties Organisation (in respect of the Nigerian Bar Association) v. Nigeria, Communication No. 101/93, 22 March 1995, para. 17, https://www.achpr.org/sessions/descions?id=85 (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights). 57 UN Special Rapporteurs on freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, and human rights defenders, Joint Letter, 22 November 2016, p. 9, https://bit.ly/3XilSaB (commenting on the involvement of intelligence and security services in NGO regulation in Egypt). 58 See, for example, Report of the UN Special Rapporteur for human rights while countering terrorism, 1 March 2019, para. 60, A/HRC/40/52. The Centre for Law and Democracy is a non-profit human rights organisation working internationally to provide legal expertise on foundational rights for democracy. 12