5/17/23, 10:44 PM OTF | The decentralised infrastructure of online censorship in Asia However, the 2014 regulations (later amended in 2020) did allow Indonesian ISPs to block websites on their own discretion, causing inconsistencies in what is blocked across ISPs (https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internetcensorship/). This delegation of powers to ISPs means that they hold significant influence over what their customers are able to access and not. Popular services like Vimeo and Reddit have been found to be blocked only by a chunk of Indonesian ISPs, while they remain accessible to others. There has historically not been any centralised infrastructure used by the Government for implementing information controls. This scenario may also be changing with some desire for centralised control. For instance, in 2022, a proposal (https://www.idnog.or.id/en/download.html? f=MjAyMjA3MjkwMjE1NDAucGRm&id=MTQ=) appeared in a Indonesia Network Operators' Group (IGNOG) and Indonesia Internet Service Provider Association (APJII) presentation to centralise DNS queries. In such a model, all DNS queries would be forwarded to the DNS servers in internet exchanges – that would ostensibly be directly overseen by state authorities or by the APJII. Our work did not present any evidence that this DNS forwarding has been implemented yet, but the internet censorship research community continues to document how the methods of blocking across ISPs are changing. Conclusion These case studies reveal that information controls in a single jurisdiction can exist at multiple levels – public and private ISPs, internet exchange points, lines of international connectivity or other network chokepoints controlled by the state. A comprehensive understanding of information controls in a country requires us to investigate – among its many aspects – the law and its technical implementation by state and private actors. The case studies reveal in jurisdictions with decentralised controls, ISPs – by choosing opaque methods of blocking or by hiding the reasons of why a website is inaccessible – can exacerbate the effects of state-ordered censorship. Decentralised information controls may not always result in better outcomes for internet freedom in comparison to centralised information controls. As we see in Indonesia, ISPs may be given the discretion to block websites on their own, resulting in arbitrary blocking beyond what the government explicitly requires to be blocked. The findings and implications of the research across India, Pakistan and Indonesia are summarised in an essay I authored, which will appear later this year in a volume on the politics of Internet infrastructure by Meatspace Press. Much of the technical evidence of online censorship is only possible because of network measurements, such as those collected and analysed by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI). Our analysis of the network measurements (https://ooni.org/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/) in OONI revealed that many instances of censorship from India, Pakistan and Indonesia were mis-classified as errors. We will continue to improve the quality of data to help researchers, journalists and civil society expose and fight against internet censorship. The evidence of online censorship from countries decentralised information controls uncovers the critical role that private players such as ISPs play in how the rights to access information and freedom of expression are exercised online. We developed a questionnaire and assessment framework for ISPs (https://github.com/gurshabad/gurshabad.github.io/blob/master/writing/isp-assessment.md) that civil society organisations worldwide can use to push these private players to incorporate respect of human rights in their This website deploys cookies foramount basic functionality andhave to keep it secure. These cookies arethey strictly necessary. Optional policies and processes. With the of leeway ISPs in implementing state orders, can also analysis cookies which provide us with statistical information about the use of the website may also be deployed, but only minimise the effects of state censorship by reading legal orders narrowly and/or by choosing technical methods with your consent. Please review our Privacy that make censorship apparent to internet users.& Data Policy (https://www.opentech.fund/about/tos/privacy/) for more information. At the same time, it is important to strengthen the security properties of network protocols, so that they are more resistant to censorship from governments and private actors. Our ongoing efforts include pushing for considerations for human rights when designing internet protocols (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtfhrpc-guidelines/), Your cookie settings https://www.opentech.fund/news/the-decentralised-infrastructure-of-online-censorship-in-asia/ 4/5