5/17/23, 10:44 PM OTF | The decentralised infrastructure of online censorship in Asia The legal framework for online censorship in Pakistan is quite similar to India’s current regime, in that a state authority – the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) – is empowered to block resources for the public and direct ISPs in the jurisdiction to do so. However, our comparative review (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4404965) of the legal framework and jurisprudence reveals more robust procedural safeguards for citizens and an involved judiciary. For instance, the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) explicitly allows content creators, website owners and any person aggrieved with censorship orders to file an appeal against the PTA. Even though there is no ex-ante procedural safeguard in the law, the Islamabad High Court has admonished the PTA and directed it to offer a pre-decisional hearing to any citizen of Pakistan whose online content would be affected by censorship orders. Since the law grants unilateral power to the PTA and does not mandate judicial or parliamentary scrutiny of the censorship orders, the concerns of arbitrary censorship by the executive (https://bolobhi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Pakistan%E2%80%99s-Online-Censorship-Regime.pdf) remain despite these progressive judicial pronouncements. Historically, the technical infrastructure of censorship in Pakistan was ‘decentralised’ as well, but is undergoing changes in recent years. While there is some diversity of market players, the PTA seems to be exploiting the fact that a significant portion of internet subscribers in Pakistan are served by entities controlled directly or indirectly by state enterprises (https://www.pta.gov.pk/assets/media/annual_report_2020_15012021.zip). Most lines of international connectivity (https://bolobhi.org/state-of-it-governance-in-pakistan-a-report-by-bolo-bhi/) are also under the direct control of state agencies. This network topology means that the PTA is easily advancing on more centralised control over infrastructure. The PTA has acknowledged (https://www.codastory.com/authoritarian-tech/pakistan-web-monitoringsurveillance/) the successful implementation of the Web Monitoring System (https://www.pta.gov.pk/assets/media/tender_150218.pdf) (WMS), deployed at internet traffic exchanges and lines of international connectivity. The system is capable of monitoring and filtering internet traffic going upstream from most ISPs in Pakistan. In 2022, it was also reported (https://www.dawn.com/news/1693213/pta-at-odds-with-isps-over-domain-policy) that the PTA wants all ISPs in the country to direct all DNS requests from internet users in the country to specified servers. However, this has not been implemented (https://tribune.com.pk/story/2362666/ptadismisses-reports-of-implementing-centralised-dns-control) yet, possibly due to pushback from ISPs. Thus, we see a concerted move towards centralised and mostly state-controlled infrastructure for online censorship in Pakistan. Indonesia Indonesia has also followed the decentralised model of information controls, with state authorities having the power to send legal orders to ISPs to block access to online resources. There are both private and public internet service providers (https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-net/2021) in Indonesia, among which there is diverse interconnection and international connectivity (https://citizenlab.ca/2013/10/igf-2013-anoverview-of-indonesian-internet-infrastructure-and-governance/). This website deploys cookies for basic functionality and to keep it secure. These cookies are strictly necessary. Optional analysis cookies which provide us with statistical information about the use of the website may also be deployed, but only The Indonesian Government has issued technical guidance (https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx? with your consent. Please review our Privacy & Data Policy (https://www.opentech.fund/about/tos/privacy/) for more g=99fc618d-232e-4590-b4cd-e456496e5ce9) to ISPs in the form of regulations information. (https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=99fc618d-232e-4590-b4cd-e456496e5ce9). Indonesia is also different from India and Pakistan in the aspect that there is some transparency in what is blocked, with the TRUST+ Positif (https://trustpositif.kominfo.go.id/) list (which ISPs were mandated to follow as per regulations issued in 2014) being publicly available. This fact theoretically means greater coordination among ISPs, and one would not expect different websites to be blocked on different ISPs. Your cookie settings https://www.opentech.fund/news/the-decentralised-infrastructure-of-online-censorship-in-asia/ 3/5