We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated Updates from Threat Group (TAG) influence operations linkedAnalysis to Iran. This campaign posted content in English, Hebrew, and Arabic supporting anti-government protests in Israel. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook. We terminated 9 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt. This campaign posted content in Arabic supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and critical of Israel and Saudi Arabia. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook. We terminated 6 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran. This campaign posted content in Farsi and Dari about current events and included some content that misrepresented itself as Turkish and Afghan news outlets. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook. OK We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar Myanmar. This domestic campaign was linked to the Arakan Army and posted content that misrepresented itself as local news. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook. We terminated 3,407 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and cooking. A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about the U.S. response to COVID-19 and social unrest in the U.S. We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation. These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 and Q3 TAG bulletins. December We terminated 1 YouTube channel and 1 advertising account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. This campaign uploaded content in Russian critical of the Ukrainian government. Google serves cookies to analyze traffic to this site. Information about your use of our site is shared with Google for that purpose. See details. We terminated 1 blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Argentina. The campaign uploaded content in Spanish that was critical of an Ecuadorian member of parliament.

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