130 Dictating the Internet: Throughout the LOCS, an absence of independent oversight, redress and accountability mechanisms is evident – orders by a court or any other independent body are not required for State authorities to penalize companies which fail to comply with censorship obligations, cybersecurity audits, reporting requirements, obligations to furnish user data or data localization requests, and there is no provision for appeal or judicial review of orders made by the MPS or MIC under the law.498 The LOCS will likely become another legal tool misused by the Vietnamese government to clamp down on expression and information online.499 Indeed, the law came into force in the midst of increased efforts by the State to control online discourse, including through a crackdown on human rights defenders, activists and independent bloggers.500 In July 2017, Vietnam’s Minister of Information and Communications (MIC) reportedly stated that his ministry had successfully requested technological companies Google and Facebook to remove “3,367 clips with bad and poisonous content” and “more than 600 accounts that have violating content”501, and in December 2017, a military cyber unit, ‘Force 47’, was set up with approximately 10,000 persons tasked to monitor the internet and “combat erroneous views” and “wrongful opinions” expressed online about the government.502 In December 2018, the Journalists’ Association of Vietnam introduced a new code of conduct for social media use, prohibiting its member journalists from posting news, images or comments that “run counter to” the State.503 498 BSA The Software Alliance also noted this in its comments to the Vietnamese government during a public consultation on the Draft Decree, See BSA, 13 December 2018. 499 Notably, in May 2018, it was reported that Nguyen Thanh Hong, a member of the committee in the National Assembly coordinating the review of the LOCS, himself conceded that “it won’t be right to say that the law will not affect the interests of organizations and individuals… (b)ut there has to be a choice made between national security interests and the protection of people’s legal rights versus personal freedom and the right to use the internet.” See Bao Ha, ‘Cyber security law restrictions worry Vietnamese legislators’, VN Express International, 29 May 2018, Available at: https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/cyber-security-law-restrictions-worry-vietnameselegislators-3756271.html 500 See Section III (iv). 501 Human Rights Watch, ‘Vietnam: Withdraw Problematic Cyber Security Law’, 7 June 2018 (‘HRW, Vietnam Cyber Security Law’), Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/07/ vietnam-withdraw-problematic-cyber-security-law; Referring to [Vietnamese] Khôi Nguyên, ‘Google và Facebook tiếp tục gỡ bỏ, ngăn chặn thông tin xấu độc’, Baó Moí, 14 July 2017, Available at: https://baomoi.com/google-va-facebook-tiep-tuc-go-bo-ngan-chan-thong-tin-xaudoc/c/22753780.epi 502 HRW, Vietnam Cyber Security Law; Referring to [Tiếng Việt] Thời Sự, ‘Hơn 10.000 người trong ‘Lực lượng 47’ đấu tranh trên mạng’, Tuổi Trẻ, 25 December 2017, Available at: https://tuoitre. vn/hon-10-000-nguoi-trong-luc-luong-47-dau-tranh-tren-mang-20171225150602912.htm; James Hookway, ‘Introducing Force 47, Vietnam’s New Weapon Against Online Dissent’, Wall Street Journal, 31 December 2017, Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/introducing-force-47vietnams-new-weapon-against-online-dissent-1514721606 503 Associated Free Press, ‘Vietnam’s cyber-security law takes effect amid criticism’, Straits Times, 2 January 2019, Available at: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/vietnams-cyber-security-law-takes-