IV. Legal Framework 66 power, and other acts.354 More specifically in the context of non-State actors, the Rome Statute criminalizes certain acts “committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities,” when such hostilities comprise “an armed conflict not of an international character.”355 These acts include violence to life and person, in particular killing of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture; committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; taking of hostages; rape and any other form of sexual violence; the passing of judgments or carrying out of executions without due process; and other acts.356 Three essential elements must be present to establish a war crime: first, there must be an armed conflict; second, one of the prohibited acts must be committed against a protected person; and third, there must be a nexus between the armed conflict and the act committed. Protected persons include all individuals who are not actively involved in the armed conflict. In the context of the violence perpetrated by non-state actors in the Bangladesh refugee camps, Fortify Rights has reasonable grounds to believe that all such elements are satisfied, and that, as a result—at the very least—further investigation into the possibility of ongoing war crimes should be pursued. First, there is reason to believe an ongoing armed conflict exists in Myanmar involving non-State actors, the Myanmar military junta, and others. The U.N. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM) found in September 2018 that it had “reasonable grounds to consider that the conflict between the Myanmar government forces and ARSA [Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army] amounts to a non-international armed conflict at least since 25 August 2017.”357 Since the FFM’s determination in September 2018, ARSA has split into varying factions, resulting in the rise of various armed Rohingya groups opposing or cooperating with the Myanmar military junta in Rakhine State, chief among them the re-immergence of the RSO.358 Fortify Rights has interviewed several ARSA and RSO members who spoke in great detail of armed conflict and a command structure within the militant groups. For example, one ARSA senior leader told Fortify Rights in August 2024: “The commander-in-chief is Atta Ullah. … We fight in Myanmar. Ata Ullah is in Myanmar.”359 There are several senior leaders and commanders below Atta Ullah, including Haled, a senior commander; Mullah Mustak, a commander involved in intelligence; and Shek Borhan, a senior spokesperson and commander.360 Similarly, a leadership structure exists within the RSO, with senior leaders including Ayub Khan (also known as Saiful), the commanderin-chief of the military; RSO’s political spokesperson Ko Ko Linn; and many others.361 A video distributed by the RSO in 2021 showed the RSO conducting military training and declaring to “fight the [Myanmar military] regime for the rights of the Rohingya people.”362 In a television interview in 2024, Ayub Khan told the Bangladesh media outlet Jamuna TV: 354 Ibid. 355 Id. at Art. 8(c). 356 Ibid. Rome Statue, Art. 8(e)(vi). 357 Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, September 17, 2018, para. 59. 358 Naing Lin, Transitional Institute, A New Dimension to Armed Conflicts in Arakan?: Core Tactics of Myanmar Military’s ‘Divide and Contain’ Strategy, September 20, 2023, https://www.tni.org/en/article/a-new-dimension-to-armedconflicts-in-arakan; International Crisis Group, Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Limiting the Damage of a Protracted Crisis, October 4, 2023, p. 2, https://icg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-10/wl-rohingya-04x23.pdf; Patrick Dupont, “ARSA After the Myanmar Coup: Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” The Diplomat, January 24, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/arsa-after-the-myanmar-coup-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place/; “Rohingya Armed Groups Active Again in Western Myanmar,” The Irrawaddy, September 20, 2021, https://www.irrawaddy.com/ news/burma/rohingya-armed-groups-active-again-in-western-myanmar.html. 359 Fortify Rights interview with A.A.B., exact location withheld, Bangladesh, August 2024. 360 See, Fortify Rights interviews with A.A.B. and A.A.C., exact location withheld, Bangladesh, August 2024. 361 See, Fortify Rights interview with B.D., location withheld, Bangladesh, May 6, 2024 and Fortify Rights interview with E.F., location withheld, Bangladesh, October 3, 2023. 362 “Rohingya Armed Groups Active Again in Western Myanmar,” The Irrawaddy, September 20, 2021, https://www. irrawaddy.com/news/burma/rohingya-armed-groups-active-again-in-western-myanmar.html.