“I May Be Killed Any Moment” 21 Rohingya Militant Groups in Bangladesh To accommodate the newly displaced survivors of the Myanmar military’s genocidal campaign, in 2017, Bangladesh authorities expanded the pre-existing, already overcrowded refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar District.18 ARSA’s “membership” within the camps grew rapidly as the group positioned itself as ethno-nationalist defenders and liberators of the Rohingya people.19 ARSA also used violence and threats to recruit members. The group has long used the communication platform WhatsApp to recruit and communicate with its members while also using social media platforms Facebook and X (formally known as Twitter) for its public messaging.20 In the camps in Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees often refer to ARSA as “the night government,” because the group has historically operated mostly at night when there is less of a law enforcement presence in the camps.21 Under the cover of darkness, ARSA has enforced its authority through threats, abductions, and killings, increasingly spreading fear and terror among Rohingya camp residents.22 Violence has also taken place in broad daylight as a number of Rohingya militant groups struggle for control of the refugee camps.23 According to media reports, the Ministry of Defence of Bangladesh has said there are at least 11 armed militant groups operational in the camps in Bangladesh.24 Some of these groups began as ARSA and later splintered into new groups. In some cases, Rohingya criminal and militant groups identified themselves as ARSA while committing abuses, despite not being commanded by ARSA.25 Many of these groups are now vying for power in the camps, including the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), an older Rohingya armed group described by a Bangladesh National Security Intelligence representative as “highly trained.”26 18 The Inter-Sector Coordination Group, “Bangladesh: Humanitarian Response Plan,” October 3, 2017, https://reliefweb. int/report/bangladesh/bangladesh-humanitarian-response-plan-september-2017-february-2018-rohingya. 19 Ronan Lee, “Myanmar’s Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA): An Analysis of a New Muslim Militant Group and its Strategic Communications,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 15, No. 6, December 2021, p. 65, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/27090916. 20 ARSA official Twitter account was started in 2019 as “@ARSA_Official.” 21 Verena Hölzl, “The ‘Night Government’ Expands Its Violent Reach in Rohingya Camps,” New York Times, April 28, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/30/world/asia/bangladesh-rohingya-refugee-camp.html. 22 Ibid. 23 Rebecca Tan, “The Rohingya Fled Genocide. Now, Violence Stalks Them as Refugees,” Washington Post, March 7, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/07/rohingya-refugees-targeted-killings-cox-bazar/. 24 It is outside the scope of this report to detail a complete list of militant groups in the camps; however, in addition to RSO and ARSA, some include the Arakan Rohingya Army, Islami Mahas, Nobi Hossain, and Munna. See, “Rohingya Camps: ARSA, 9 Other Armed Groups Found Active,” Daily Star, February 16, 2023, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/ bangladesh/news/rohingya-camps-arsa-9-other-armed-groups-found-active-3249041. 25 In his book, I Feel No Peace: Rohingya Fleeing Over Seas and Rivers, j‎ ournalist and author Kaamil Ahmed wrote about Rohingya criminal groups not commanded by ARSA but taking on their name: “[The criminal gangs in the camps] were not necessarily creations of ARSA, but swore allegiance to the group. They arbitrarily attempted to enforce conservative moral codes on women who worked, claiming they were corrupted by outside influences, and harassed young activists or community leaders they saw as opponents. They were little more than a nuisance themselves but drew confidence from their more experienced commanders, who sat in the background and tried to build up authority. Though ARSA projected a clean image, those who represented them, like Nurul Alam and Yaba-linked Master Munna, had shady backgrounds that provided useful revenue streams. They presented themselves as respectable men, often spending money in the community or on mosques while young henchmen bullied the rest into submission, insisting majhi’s report to these leaders and searching the phones of whoever they suspected might be sharing critical views. They soon had much of Kutupalong under their thumb, operating at night without interference from security forces, who rarely ventured beyond the camp entrances. In reality, there were actually several groups competing for influence and using abductions as their main means of intimidation.” Kaamil Ahmed, I Feel No Peace: Rohingya Fleeing Over Seas and Rivers, (‎ London: Hurst, 2023), pp. 164-165. 26 Nazmul Ahasan, “In Bangladesh’s Border with Myanmar, 2 Rohingya Militant Groups Fight for Dominance,” Radio Free Asia, February 2, 2023, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/bangladeshborderrohingya-02022023153254.html.