Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 B. Page 4 Aligning with the Regime As the Arakan Army began advancing into Rohingya-dominated northern Rakhine in early 2024, the Myanmar military sought to mobilise Muslims against it.17 Though the vast majority of Rohingya are not recognised as Myanmar citizens, the junta used the pretext of national conscription to recruit thousands of them into militia units.18 Alongside this recruitment campaign, the military also attempted to foment communal tensions between the Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhists, who constitute the largest ethnic group in Rakhine State and are the Arakan Army’s support base. At first, most Rohingya recruitment into the army was forced or the result of inducement, but later some Rohingya men volunteered out of anger at the Arakan Army, which had by then been accused of widespread human right violations against Rohingya in Buthidaung (see Section II.C below).19 Regime commanders also forged alliances with Rohingya armed groups, seeking their support to defend both Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships. At first, the military worked with ARSA – an unexpected turn of events, given that the group had been responsible for the 2016-2017 attacks that prompted the military campaign against the Rohingya. In April-May 2024, ARSA and the military fought alongside each other against the Arakan Army in both Buthidaung and Maungdaw. Though the RSO initially claimed to be seeking an alliance with the Arakan Army, by April 2024, its forces were also clashing with the armed group in Maungdaw.20 The RSO then reached an agreement with the Myanmar military and, together with the smaller ARA, began a forced recruitment campaign in the refugee camps of southern Bangladesh.21 Many of these recruits were sent to Maungdaw, where they received training from the military.22 While the military was able to hold out against the Arakan Army in Maungdaw for more than six months – far longer than in most other parts of the state – it is unclear how much of a role Rohingya fighters played in drawing out the township’s defence. When the Arakan Army stepped up its attacks in early August, RSO leaders fled to Bangladesh; many recent RSO recruits soon followed.23 Though there are no official figures, thousands of fighters from the Arakan Army, the Myanmar military, and 17 Even after 750,000 fled in 2017, the Rohingya still accounted for 75 per cent of the population in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships, according to township profiles that the General Administration Department produced in 2019. These figures should be considered estimates. 18 In February 2024, the military regime began enforcing the dormant People’s Military Service Law and has since conscripted around 5,000 young men per month. The recruitment of Rohingya men coincided with the introduction of conscription but occurred outside this framework, however, as the vast majority of Rohingya do not have citizenship documents. 19 Crisis Group Report, Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State, op. cit. 20 Ibid. 21 Around 2,000 Rohingya refugees are thought to have been recruited, mainly by force, from southern Bangladesh in April-May 2024. The campaign quickly dissipated due to a combination of resistance from refugees – including mass protests and even attempts to lynch RSO members – and diplomatic pressure on the Bangladeshi government. The campaign caused major damage to the RSO’s standing among Rohingya refugees, enabling groups such as ARSA and Rohingya Islamic Mahaz to gain a stronger position within the camps. 22 Crisis Group interview, source who was present in Maungdaw, March 2025. 23 Ibid.